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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). By Order dated January 6, 2009, the Utah Supreme Court
transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals subject to the right of the parties to
request that the Court retain the matter. This Court subsequently vacated the prior order
of transfer and elected to retain jurisdiction over this appeal by Order dated January 30,
2009.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellants (hereinafter the "North Hayden Group" or the "Group") present the
following issues in this appeal:
1.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of

Defendant/Appellee Roosevelt City, concluding that the North Hayden Group did not
have a protectable property interest that was taken by the City despite the fact that the
City's continuous pumping of the Hayden Well Field wells has resulted in dewatering the
Group's lands, thereby rendering the Group's lands barren and their surface water rights
useless? (Issue preserved: R. 254-261.)
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^f 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation and citation
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omitted).
2.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of

Roosevelt City, concluding that the City has not interfered with the North Hayden
Group's water rights despite the fact that the City's continuous pumping of the Hayden
Well Field wells is depleting the aquifer underlying the Group's lands, thereby creating
an artificial condition in the lands which has deprived the Group of their water rights and
has rendered the Group's properties barren? (Issue preserved: R. 245-254.)
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^[ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
3.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of

Roosevelt City, concluding that the North Hayden Group's claim for interference with
water rights is barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act despite the fact that the
City's wells, due to their depth and perforated casings, tap into and deplete the
unconfined aquifer underlying the Group's land, thereby dewatering the Group's lands?
(Issue preserved: R. 245-247.)
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^[6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation and citation
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omitted).
4.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the City,

concluding that the City did not owe the North Hayden Group a duty to refrain from
depleting the aquifer below their properties even though such conduct unreasonably and
substantially invades the Group's rights? (Issue preserved: R. 242-245.)
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, % 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
5.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of

Roosevelt City, concluding that the continuous tort rule does not apply to the North
Hayden Group's interference with water rights, negligence, and takings claims when the
undisputed facts show that the City's continuous pumping of the wells has the effect of
further decreasing the level of the aquifer and further increasing the extent of the Group's
property damage? (Issue preserved: R. 240-242.)
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES
The North Hayden Group attaches to its Addendum a copy of the following
determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules:
(1) U.S. Const, amend V.
(2) Utah Const, art. I, sec. 22.
(3) Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-201, -301 (2004).
(4) Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 (2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case:
This is an appeal by a group of land and water right owners who farm in the North
Hayden area located outside Roosevelt City, Utah. The North Hayden Group appeals
from the district court's order denying them any relief whatsoever from the harmful and
damaging effects of the City's mining of the Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer, an unconfined,
shallow aquifer underlying the North Hayden Group's lands.1
2, Course of Proceedings;
This appeal arises from a Complaint filed by the North Hayden Group on June 3,
2004, in the Eighth Judicial District Court for the State of Utah. (R. 1-16.) The North
Hayden Group's Complaint sought relief from, and damages for, the increasing
1

Groundwater mining results from continued overdraft, which occurs when the water
level drops because "the rate of withdrawal from a basin [or aquifer] is greater than its
recharge rate." Susan Batty Peterson, Note, Designation and Protection of Critical
Groundwater Areas, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1393, 1394 (1991).
4831 -9434-5219/NO075-001
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deterioration and dewatering of their lands caused by Roosevelt City's continuous
pumping of five wells in the Hayden Well Field, which draw water from the unconfined
Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer underlying the Group's farms and pasture lands. (R. 2-7, 910.) Specifically, the Complaint stated that Roosevelt City's development and use of the
wells in the Hayden Well Field has caused the water table beneath the North Hayden
Group's lands to decrease substantially, thereby dewatering the Group's once-productive
farm lands. (R. 9-10.)

As a result of this dewatering, the North Hayden Group is no

longer able to effectively irrigate their lands because the water they apply to their lands
will no longer flow across the fields but is instead quickly absorbed and drawn down far
beneath the surface, past the root systems of the crops and pasture vegetation, in order to
replenish the depleted aquifer. (R. 9-10.) Consequently, the North Hayden Group can no
longer grow hay, pasture their cattle, or derive income from their properties as they had
consistently done in the past, and their water rights and the land to which the water rights
are appurtenant have lost substantially all of their value. (R. 9.)
On September 9, 2008, Roosevelt City filed a motion for summary judgment. (R.
132-133.)

In its supporting memorandum, the City argued that the North Hayden

Group's claims should be dismissed on the following grounds: (1) all three of the claims
are barred by the statutes of limitations because the Group was aware of the damage to
their properties more than four years prior to the time they filed their Complaint; (2) the
North Hayden Group's claim for interference with water rights is barred by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act because the Complaint did not allege negligent conduct
when it stated that the City's conduct "manifested a knowing and reckless indifference
4831 -9434-5219/NO075-001
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for and disregard of the [Group's] rights in their property"; (3) the City has not interfered
with the North Hayden Group's water rights because the City is pumping water that it has
lawfully appropriated; (4) the City did not take the Group's water but is instead pumping
water that it has established a right to use; and (5) the City cannot be found negligent as a
matter of law because it does not owe the Group a duty of reasonable care. (R. 160-68.)
The North Hayden Group filed their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment on October 14, 2008. (172-276.) In response to the City's statute of
limitations argument, the North Hayden Group asserted that their claims are not barred by
the statute of limitations pursuant to the continuous tort rule. (R. 240-42.) That rule
provides that the statute of limitations is deemed to run from the date of each wrongful
act or at the end of the continuing wrongful conduct. (Id)
Responding to the City's governmental immunity argument, the North Hayden
Group explained that the Governmental Immunity Act specifically waives immunity for
any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission and that their claim
properly alleges negligent conduct. (R. 245-47.) In so stating, the Group referred the
court to at least two Utah Supreme Court cases that have recognized that negligent
conduct may include conduct that "manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward
the rights of others." (R. 246.) The Group asserted that immunity has also been waived
under the Act pursuant to section 63-30d-301(3)(a)(ii), which waives immunity for a
defective and/or dangerous condition of a public improvement. (R. 245-46.)
With respect to the City's claim that it has not interfered with the North Hayden
Group's water rights even though its conduct has resulted in depleting or mining the
4831-9434-5219/NO075-001
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aquifer and dewatering the Group's lands, the North Hayden Group responded by
explaining that the City's mining of the aquifer has prevented the Group from
beneficially using their water rights. (R. 250-54.) Indeed, relying on past precedent from
this Court, the North Hayden Group asserted that they are entitled to protection from both
direct interference with their water rights and interference with the ability to beneficially
use their water rights. (Id.) Because the City's conduct in mining the unconfined aquifer
has dewatered the Group's lands and has prevented the Group from beneficially using
their surface water rights, the City should compensate the Group for the damages
resulting from that interference. (Id.)
In response to the City's defense that it did not take any protectable property
interest possessed by the North Hayden Group when it "used the water which it has
rightfully appropriated," (R. 162), the North Hayden Group explained that Utah has long
recognized that the right to beneficially use water is part of the real property rights
afforded a water right holder. (R. 260-61.) As a result, Roosevelt City's conduct in
dewatering the Group's lands and in preventing the Group from beneficially using their
water rights constitutes a taking under the Utah Constitution.

(R. 257-59, 260-61.)

Additionally, the North Hayden Group asserted that the City has taken the value and use
of their property by depleting the aquifer and preventing them from beneficially using
their own water rights, thereby triggering application of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. (R. 254-56.)
Finally, with respect to the City's claim that it has no duty to avoid mining the
aquifer, the North Hayden Group explained that the City's duty arises under two separate
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principles. (R. 242-45.) First, the City has a common law duty to avoid using its
property, which includes water rights, to the detriment of others. (R. 244-45.) Second,
the City has a statutory duty to maintain its watercourses in such a manner as to prevent
damage to the property of others. (R. 244.) The City breached both its common law duty
and its statutory duty to act reasonably and to avoid substantial harm to the Group when it
designed its wells to draw water from the shallow, unconfmed Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer
rather than the lower confined Duchesne River Formation. (R. 242-45.) Because the
Group's water rights and lands have been and are continuing to be damaged by the
depletion of the unconfmed aquifer, the North Hayden Group is entitled to recover the
damages they have incurred as a result of the City's breach. (Id.)
On November 24, 2008, without the aid of oral argument, the district court granted
Roosevelt City's motion on all grounds. (R. 290-303.) First, with respect to the statute
of limitations, the Court stated that the North Hayden Group failed to "explain how the
continuous tort rule applies to each of their separate claims" and therefore refused to
apply that rule to any of the claims before it. (R. 292.) Second, the district court found
that the Governmental Immunity Act barred the North Hayden Group's claims for
interference with water rights because the Complaint did not allege that the interference
resulted from negligence and because section 63-30d-301(3)(a)(ii) did not apply to the
facts of the case. (R. 297.) Third, in dismissing the North Hayden Group's claim for
interference, the district court reasoned that "[i]f the [c]ourt were to accept the [North
Hayden Group's] argument, it would allow the [Group] to control indirectly water which
they have no right to control directly.''' (R. 299.) With respect to the City's fourth
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argument, the district court found that the North Hayden Group's takings claims should
be dismissed because "there is no evidence that the [City] has taken the beneficial use of
the [Group's] irrigation water. The [Group is] free to use their irrigation water as they
wish." (R. 295.) Finally, the district court held that the Group's negligence claims
should be dismissed because the City "has no duty to refrain from using the water that
they have rightfully appropriated." (R. 294.) The ruling and order is attached hereto as
Addendum A. It is from this order that the North Hayden Group appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Introduction
The lands owned by the North Hayden Group have historically been flood
irrigated and have consistently produced a substantial crop and good pasture grounds.
(R. 185, 189-90, 263-66.) As is common in Utah, application of water to the land has
made the land fertile, productive and valuable. (R. 185, 189-90.) Even during droughts
in the past, the North Hayden Group's lands consistently produced a substantial crop each
year through the use of flood irrigation. (R. 185, 190). However, after the City drilled
and began pumping five separate wells in a well field located near the North Hayden
Group's properties (the "Hayden Well Field") in the early 1990s, the water table dropped
dramatically. (R. 198-99.) Lands which were once fertile and green are now barren, and
cottonwood and cedar trees that had thrived are now dead. (R. 183-85; R. 189-90; 198.)
Although the North Hayden Group continues to attempt to irrigate their lands, the water
no longer sustains crops and pasture, instead moving quickly past the root zone of the soil
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to the level of the dramatically lowered water table far below the root zone, vainly
attempting to recharge the depleted aquifer. (R. 9-10, 183-85, 189-90, 198.)
The direct cause of the damage to the North Hayden Group's property is the
continuous pumping of the Hayden Well Field wells by the City. (R. 198.) Indeed, the
North Hayden Group's expert has determined that, rather than tapping into the lower
confined Duchesne River Formation, the City's shallow wells drain the near-surface
unconfined Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer.

(R. 198-200.) Very simply, unlike the vast

number of wells in Utah which tap confined underground aquifers and do not affect the
surface water table, the City's wells drain the shallow unconfined aquifer. This aquifer,
which has historically provided a near-surface water table, has dropped over 80 feet since
the City began pumping the Hayden Well Field wells. (R. 198-201.) As a result, natural
vegetation has died and the irrigation water which is applied to the North Hayden
Group's properties is drawn quickly past the root zone of crops and natural pasture to the
substantially lowered water table, thereby depriving the Group of any beneficial use of
their water on their land. (R. 183-84; 189; 198.) This is the injury to the North Hayden
Group for which they seek compensation. (R. 1-16.)
2. The Development of the Hayden Well Field
In the early 1980s, Roosevelt City purchased property and the water rights
associated with the property located in the North Hayden area from Verl Haslem. (R.
268.) At the time of the sale, Mr. Haslem's property contained two wells, with the
associated water rights, which were approximately 90 to 95 feet deep. (Id.) Mr. Haslem
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had generally used the two wells to seasonally irrigate land adjacent to or near the
properties of the North Hayden Group. (R. 200, 268.) Mr. Haslem's wells were not
drilled or intended to be used for continuous water production where the water pumped
would be taken completely out of the hydrologic system. (R. 200.)
After purchasing Mr. Haslem's wells and water rights, in 1983, Roosevelt City
began moving other water rights to the wells. It filed a Change Application with the Utah
State Engineer to change the point of diversion of an existing water right, Water Right
No. 43-3512, to the location of Mr. Haslem's two wells (hereinafter referred to as the
"Hayden Well Field"). (R. 268.) The Change Application was approved in December
1983. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, in 1984, Roosevelt City hired a contractor to rehabilitate
and deepen the two existing wells and to drill an additional well. (R. 267-68.) At the
time of drilling, the static water level for the new well was reported as only 25.6 feet
below ground surface. (R. 267.)
In 1985, the City filed another Change Application to change the point of
diversion of Water Right 43-3607, moving another water right held by the City to the
Hayden Well Field. (Id.) The Change Application was approved on May 2, 1986, and
the City thereafter contracted to have two additional wells drilled in the Hayden Well
Field: Well No. 1A and Well No. 4. (Id,) The well reports for Well Nos. 1A and 4
indicate that, by 1990, the static water level had dropped to 64 feet and 83 feet,
respectively, (Id.)
Each of the five Hayden Well Field wells that were either rehabilitated or drilled
by the City draw water from the Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer, which is an unconfined
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shallow aquifer underlying the Hayden area that supports a near-surface water table. (Id.)
Based on information contained in technical publications on file with the Division of
Water Rights, historical data indicates that the static water level in the Hayden area
before the Hayden Well Field was established was 14.3 feet below ground surface. (R.
266-67.)

Using information provided in those publications, the North Hayden Group's

expert, Jack R. Rogers, P.G., estimated that within the short time span of 12 years, the
City's use of the Hayden Well Field had lowered the water table at least 40-50 feet from
its original level in 1978. (R. 266.) Mr. Rogers also noted that the water levels measured
and recorded by the City in 2000 and 2001 indicate that the water table has declined
further since the additional wells were completed in 1990. (Id.) And, consistent with
those measurements, the results of a test conducted in 2008 by Mr. Rogers on Well No. 5
shows that the water level in that area has dropped to 94.6 feet below ground level. (Id.)
3. The North Hayden Group's Farm and Pasture Lands
The North Hayden Group consists of farmers that own land in Duchesne and
Uintah Counties, including Fern Oberhansly and Howard Horrocks. (R. 14-16.) The
North Hayden Group's lands historically consisted of highly productive pasture and
farmlands, which allowed the Group to produce large amounts of hay and/or provide
pasture for a large number of cattle. (R. 266.) In fact, prior to 1990, the year that
Roosevelt City began pumping all five of the Hayden Well Field wells, Ms. Oberhansly
and her husband used their 120 acre parcel of land to raise and feed 75 head of cattle
year-round and to grow a plentiful crop of hay each year. (R. 265-66.) Ms. Oberhansly's
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land also had a stand of young cottonwood trees reaching approximately fifteen to twenty
feet in height and several cedar trees that provided shelter from the wind for her cattle.
(R. 190.) Similarly, prior to 1990, Mr. Horrocks' land produced a substantial crop of hay
each year, such that Mr. Horrocks averaged 4,500 bales of hay per year from only one 70
acre parcel. (R. 265). The North Hayden Group's properties were known as "good
pasture ground," meaning "a lot of water got to them in order to keep the ground—keep
the grass growing." (Id.) But this all changed once the City began mining the shallow,
unconfined Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer beneath their properties.
Within a few years after Roosevelt City began pumping from the Hayden Well
Field wells, the cottonwood and cedar trees that were growing on the Group's lands died.
(Id.) Additionally, the North Hayden Group's properties, which were once fertile and
productive, became barren. (Id.) In her affidavit, Ms. Oberhansly described how her
property, which was once able to pasture 75 head of cattle year-round, is now only able to
sustain 30 heifer calves, one cow, and one bull for only one month before being
completely stripped of its vegetation. (R. 189-90.) Although Ms. Oberhansly historically
flood irrigated 105 acres of land prior to the establishment of the Hayden Well Field, she
declared that, once the City began using the Hayden Well Field, she is now only able to
irrigate the first 40 acres of land before the water is completely absorbed into the ground.
(R. 189-90.) In an attempt to develop stock water for her land after Roosevelt City began
pumping the Hayden Well Field wells, Ms. Oberhansly and her husband contracted to
have a backhoe dig on their property. (R. 264-65.) Although the backhoe dug down
twenty feet, it never encountered any water, (264.) In contrast, before the City began
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pumping the wells, the water table was so near the ground surface that any post holes dug
would be filled with water by the following morning. (Id.)
Mr. Horrocks offered a similar description with respect to the deterioration of his
property. Mr. Horrocks successfully flood irrigated his property for years prior to the
time Roosevelt City established the Hayden Well Field. (R. 185.) But the condition of
his land began to deteriorate after Roosevelt City began pumping the wells, and Mr.
Horrocks discovered that he could no longer flood irrigate his property.

(R. 184.)

Consequently, Mr. Horrock's property stopped producing hay and instead grew only a
small amount of weeds, which Mr. Horrocks cleared only to prevent fire damage. (Id.)
Even after Mr. Horrocks installed a $100,000.00 sprinkling system, he was still unable to
produce the amount of hay that he had consistently raised before Roosevelt City began
pumping from the Hayden Well Field wells. (R. 184-85.) Indeed, Mr. Horrocks' crop
records show that he averaged approximately 2,000 bales of hay each year after the
installation of the sprinkling system, and, even in his best year during that time period,
his land only yielded 3,000 bales of hay. (R. 184.)
4. The Cause of Damages to the North Hayden Group's Land and Water Rights
Jack Rogers, a licensed Professional Geologist in both Utah and Wyoming, began
studying the Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer, which is the unconfined aquifer underlying the
Hayden Well Field and the North Hayden Group's farmlands, to determine and
understand the hydrogeology and hydrologic properties of the aquifer. (R. 201.) After
undertaking extensive review of documents and reports related to the Hayden area and
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the aquifer and tests of selected wells in that area, Mr. Rogers began monitoring and
conducting additional testing of selected wells and water sources. (Id.) Based on his
study and testing, Mr. Rogers determined that the damage to the North Hayden Group's
farmlands is caused by Roosevelt City's pumping of the Hayden Well Field wells. (R.
198.) Specifically, Mr. Rogers determined that production of the wells has caused the
water level to drop substantially around the wells, creating a large cone of depression
where the water level is significantly lower than it was historically.2 (Id.) As a result, the
irrigation water that would have flowed horizontally across the North Hayden Group's
farm and pasture lands is now drawn vertically deep into the ground to replenish the
depleted aquifer. (Id.) This, in turn, results in a reduced ability to irrigate and, thus,
produce crops or pasture on the affected lands, which include the farm and pasture lands
owned by the North Hayden Group. (Id.) Mr. Rogers concluded that the reduction of the
water table due to the production of the Hayden Well Field is a result of the City's wells,
which were not drilled deeper into the confined Duchesne River Formation but are
instead pumping from the unconfined Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer.

(Id.) With each

additional year that the City continues to pump from the Hayden Well Field wells, the
quality of the Group's farm and pasture lands continues to decrease. (R. 263.)
~ uWhen water is pumped from a well, the initial withdrawal exceeds the rate at which
groundwater flows into the vicinity of the well. The surrounding water table is lowered
and slopes toward the well, forming a cone-shaped depression. Although the dimensions
of the cone depend on the hydrologic characteristics of the aquifer, during the initial
stages of pumping, the lateral expanse of the cone of depression is small and is unlikely
to disturb possible sources of capture, such as streams. However, as pumping continues
and the cone of depression expands, the growing zone of influence of the cone is more
likely to intercept other sources of water, such as streams." 43 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. §
22.02, at 22-12 to 22-13 (1997) (footnote omitted).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The overarching position urged by Roosevelt City and adopted by the district court
below is that the law imposes no constraints upon the City in its ability to use its property
as it sees fit. Indeed, the district court ruled that, so long as Roosevelt City has lawfully
appropriated a certain quantity of water, it may divert that water without any constraints,
even when the undisputed evidence shows that such diversion substantially interferes
with and invades the property rights of others. However, this position is not supported
by, and, in fact, is clearly contrary to, the well-settled law in Utah. Accordingly, the
North Hayden Group respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court and
hold that the district court erred in finding that (1) Roosevelt City's mining of the NeoiaWhiterocks Aquifer did not effect a taking under either the Utah or United States
Constitutions; (2) the City's mining of the Aquifer cannot interfere with the Group's
water rights or the right to beneficially use their water rights; (3) the Group's interference
claim is barred by the Governmental Immunity Act; (4) the City did not owe the Group a
duty to refrain from using its property in a manner that was injurious to the Group; and
(5) the continuous tort rule did not apply to the Group's claims.
First, this Court should reverse the district court's finding that the City's mining of
the Aquifer, which has the effect of causing the Group's surface waters to be captured
and redirected far beneath the ground to replenish the depleted aquifer, did not constitute
a taking. It is well-settled that a water right holder's interest in his or her water right
includes and, in fact, depends on the right to beneficially use the water right. In this case,
the North Hayden Group had historically used their surface water rights to irrigate their
4831 -9434-5219/NO075-001
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farms and pasture lands. However, by mining the unconfined, shallow Neola-Whiterocks
Aquifer, the City has taken away the use and value of the Group's surface water rights
and has deprived the Group of their ability to beneficially use their water rights. The
City's conduct has also resulted in the taking of the near-surface water that had
historically sustained natural vegetation on the Group members' properties. Lastly, the
City's conduct has rendered the Group's lands barren and unproductive. Because the
Group has a protectable property interest in their land, including their near-surface water,
and the right to beneficially use their surface water rights, the Group has stated a claim
for takings such that the case should be remanded to allow the Group to proceed to trial.
Second, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling that the City's mining
of the aquifer has not interfered with the Group's surface water rights when the evidence
clearly shows that the City's conduct has resulted in diverting the Group's water in order
to replenish the depleted aquifer. Utah has long recognized that the quantity, quality, and
method of diversion of a water right are protected under the law. Additionally, Utah law
protects against conduct which has the effect of preventing a prior water user from
continuing a beneficial use of a water right.

In this case, the undisputed evidence

demonstrated that the City's mining of the shallow, near-surface aquifer has caused the
level of the aquifer to decrease over 80 feet. The evidence also established that, as a
result of this substantial decrease in the aquifer's level, the Group's surface waters are
captured and redirected far beneath the ground to replenish the depleted aquifer. As the
City's diversion of water has substantially and detrimentally interfered with the Group's
water rights, the City must compensate the Group for its damages. Consequently, this
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Court should reverse the district court's ruling and remand the cause for trial.
Third, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling that the Governmental
Immunity Act ("Act") barred the Group's interference claim. The Act waives immunity
for both negligent conduct and defective or dangerous public improvements.

The

Group's Complaint alleged that the City's conduct in interfering with their water rights
was "intentional, willful, and malicious, or at least manifested a knowing and reckless
indifference for and disregard of the [Group's] rights in their property." As this Court
has previously held that "a knowing and reckless indifference for and disregard o f the
rights of another can be negligent conduct, the City is not immune under the Act.
Additionally, because the Hayden Well Field wells were defectively designed to draw
water from the shallow, unconfined Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer rather than the confined,
Duchesne River Formation, and have caused damage to the Group's property as a result
of such a design, immunity is again waived under the Act. Therefore, the district court's
ruling should be reversed and this cause should be remanded for trial.
Fourth, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling that the City does not
owe a duty to the Group to refrain from diverting its water in manner that is injurious to
the rights of others. The law expressly limits a property owner's rights to use his or her
property when such use detrimentally and substantially invades the rights of others.
Additionally, under Utah law, the City is statutorily obligated to maintain its wells so as
to prevent damage to the property of others. As such, the district court's finding that the
City did not owe a duty to the Group is erroneous and should be reversed.
Finally, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling that the continuous tort
4831 -9434-5219/NO075-001
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rule does not apply to Group's claims for takings, interference with water rights, and
negligence. The continuous tort rule provides that the statute of limitations begins to run
after each wrongful act has occurred or at the end of the continuing wrongful conduct.
Because the Group presented evidence, which was not disputed by the City, that the
City's ongoing conduct in continuing to pump from each of the Hayden Well Field wells
has the effect of continually increasing the extent of the Group's damages, the rule should
be applied. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court and remand for trial.
ARGUMENT
L The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on the Takings
Claims because the North Hayden Group Has a Protectable Property
Interest in both their Lands and the Water Rights Used to Irrigate those
Lands.
The district court erred in finding that Roosevelt City's mining of the NeolaWhiterocks Aquifer did not effect a taking of the North Hayden Group's protectable
property interests. The undisputed facts presented to the district court shows that
Roosevelt's conduct has created an artificial condition which has caused the water
applied by the North Hayden Group to their lands to be captured and directed
underground to replenish the aquifer depleted by the City's pumping of the wells, thereby
damaging the Group's lands and rendering their water rights virtually useless.

As

discussed more fully below, the North Hayden Group has a protectable property interest
in their farm and pasture lands and their right to beneficially use the water rights
associated with those lands. Accordingly, the City is not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on the Group's takings claims under the Utah and United States Constitutions.

4831 -9434-5219/NO075-001

19

Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment
in favor of the City and remand the cause for trial.
a.

Property Rights Protected under the Utah Constitution

As is well known, Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that
"[pjrivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation." Utah Const, art. I, sec. 22. To establish a claim for taking under the
Utah Constitution, a claimant must first "demonstrate some protectable interest in
property." Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah
1996) (internal quotations omitted). "If the claimant possesses a protectable property
interest, the claimant must then show that the interest has been taken or damaged by
government action." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). A taking "is any
substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its
value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah 1990)
(internal quotations omitted). "Damage" for purposes of an Article I, section 22 claim,
"requires a definite physical injury cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on
the present market value." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
"Before a property interest will be considered protectable under Article I, Section
22," the claimant "must show a legitimate claim of entitlement to it, or in other words, a
vested, legally enforceable interest." Stevens v. LaVerkin City, 2008 UT App 129, \ 21,
183 P.3d 1059 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "The kinds of property subject

4831 -9434-5219/NO075-001

20

to the [eminent domain] right. . . [are] practically unlimited," Strawberry Elec, 918 P.2d
at 877 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted), and it is unquestioned that
the ownership of land and the ownership of a water right are both protected property
rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-502; see also Sigurd City v. State, 142 P.2d 154,
157 (Utah 1943) ("To the extent that the plaintiffs taking of the waters of Rosses Creek
deprived the defendants of the use of water which would otherwise have been used upon
their lands the plaintiff has taken the defendants' water.").
i. The Right to Beneficially Use Water Is a Protected Property Right
The right to beneficially use water is a property interest protected by the Utah
Constitution. Beneficial use of water is the very essence of a water right. Indeed,
without beneficial use there is no water right.

As the often cited statute says,

"[b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of
water in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (2008). Utah courts have often commented
on the fundamental role beneficial use plays in determining the extent of the property
rights that make up a water right. For example, in Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003
UT 50, 84 P.3d 1134, this Court held that a contract could not be interpreted as limiting
beneficial use, declaring that the amount of water that can be beneficially used is the
amount of water to which the water right holder is "lawfully entitled." Id. at f 33; see
also Fisher v. Bountiful City, 59 P. 520, 521 (Utah 1899) ("The dominion and right to the
use of the water, and the control and diversion of the same for irrigation, culinary, and
other beneficial purposes, was vested in the plaintiffs by their appropriation and use, and
they could not be deprived of such right, except by their voluntary act, by forfeiture, or
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by operation of law.").
Recognizing the fundamental role that beneficial use plays in determining the
extent of a water right holder's interest in a water right, this Court has held that a taking
is not limited solely to the actual taking of a quantity of water to which a water right
holder is entitled. Rather, as stated in Sigurd City, "[i]t is not necessary that such waters
be actually taken into plaintiffs pipelines. All that is necessary is that the defendants be
deprived of the use of such waters by some action of the plaintiff" 142 P.2d at 157
(emphasis added); accord Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d
1241, 1244 (Utah 1990) ("[Severance damages may be recoverable where property not
actually taken is damaged by the construction or use of the improvement."). Thus, under
existing Utah statutes and case law, it cannot be reasonably argued that the taking of
beneficial use is not a compensable taking. Yet, by disregarding the effects of the City's
conduct in depleting the aquifer and dewatering the overlying lands, the district court's
ruling essentially adopts such an argument.
//. The Group's Property Right of Beneficial Use of Water Was Taken by the City
In granting the City summary judgment, the district court declared, "there is no
evidence that the [City] has taken the beneficial use of the [Group's] irrigation water.
The [Group is] free to use their irrigation water as they wish." (R. 295). But this finding
is contrary to the undisputed evidence presented to the court, which showed that, as a
direct result of the City's conduct, the Group is not free to beneficially use their irrigation
water as they wish. Ms. Oberhansly's and Mr. Horrock's affidavits demonstrate that the
Group cannot use their water to effectively flood irrigate their lands as they had
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previously done in the past because the water cannot travel horizontally across their
fields. (R. 184-85, 189-90.) This is so because the City's continuous pumping of its
wells is depleting the near-surface aquifer by creating a large cone of depression that
extends outward encompassing each of the North Hayden Group's properties. (R. 198.)
As a direct result of this artificial condition created by the City, rather than
flowing horizontally across the Group's lands to irrigate the crops, the irrigation water
applied to the affected lands is now captured within the large cone of depression and
pulled down through the ground to the substantially lowered water level, which, as of
2008, is nearly 100 feet below ground level, at least 80 feet lower than before the City
began pumping. (Id,) This means that, although the Group is technically "free" to do as
they wish with their water, they cannot beneficially use their water for the approved
purpose and place of use, i.e., irrigation on their farmlands.
Because, as discussed above, the Group has a protectable property interest in their
ability to beneficially use their water, a part of their water rights just as much as their
right to divert and transport the water to their fields,3 Article I, section 22 mandates that
the City compensate the Group because its conduct has interfered with and deprived the
Group of the value of that right.4 See Sigurd City, 142 P.2d at 157; Fisher, 59 P. at 521.
iii. Near-Surface Water Which Supports Vegetation is a Protected Property Right
In addition to the fact that the North Hayden Group is entitled to recover damages
3

Either through water rights issued by the State Engineer, through shares of a water
company, or through water rights leased from the Uintah and Ouray Project administered
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
4
Additionally, by dewatering the once-productive farm and pasture lands, the City is also
liable under Article I, section 22 for taking the value of the Group's lands.
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for the City's taking of their lands and the right to beneficially use their water rights, the
Group is also entitled to damages for the taking of their right to sufficient near-surface
water to support natural vegetation. Although section 73-1-1 broadly classifies all water
in the state of Utah as "property of the public," Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1, this Court has
recognized one exception to this rule. Specifically, in Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d
922 (Utah 1949), this Court held that
[wjhere, as here, in its natural state water is diffused and percolates through
the soil so near the surface that without artificial diversion or application it
produces plant life and thereby beneficially affects the land, and where its
course cannot be traced onto the lands of any person other than the owner
of the land where it is found, such water is percolating waters and as such
are a part of the soil, they are not public waters, and the right to the use
thereof cannot be acquired by appropriation under our appropriation statute.
Id. at 929. To hold otherwise, the Court noted, would require every owner of land that
has a near-surface water table which sub-irrigates the land, such as the Group's, to "make
application to appropriate such waters and unnecessarily divert the water from its natural
course in order to preserve his right to the use thereof even though it would be more
economical and beneficial to allow it to proceed in accordance with nature." Id. at 930.
In this case, it is undisputed that the North Hayden Group's land has benefited
from the near-surface water table. This near-surface water table was sufficient to sustain
plant life in the form of cottonwood and cedar trees. (R. 189-190.) Therefore, pursuant
to the rule enunciated in Riordan, the members of the North Hayden Group, as owners of
the land, also own a private right to the near-surface water sufficient to sustain plant life.
This property right runs with the land and is not dependent upon the holding of any
independent water right. By continually pumping the Hayden Well Field wells and
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mining the unconfined aquifer, the City has taken this property right from the North
Hayden Group in violation of Article I, section 22. Thus, this Court should reverse the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and hold that the City is
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In its order, the district court refused to apply the Riordan rule, holding that the
rule is inapplicable because the groundwater was not "secluded" to only the Group's
property. (R. 295.) But, in so holding, the district court failed to recognize that Riordan
does not require that the groundwater be confined to a specific parcel of property (a
virtual impossibility);5 rather, Riordan focuses on whether groundwater, the course of
which cannot be traced, is so near the surface that it constitutes "part of the soil." 203
P.2d at 929. Because the undisputed evidence shows that the North Hayden Group's land
had been supported by water so near the surface that it sustained the growth of vegetation
and trees on the lands, the Group members are entitled to the continued use of that nearsurface groundwater pursuant to Riordan.
bl

Property Right Protection under the United States Constitution

In addition to constituting a taking under the Utah Constitution, the City's mining
of the aquifer and dewatering of the North Hayden Group's properties also violates the
United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
5

The district court's ruling would essentially abrogate the Riordan rule because
groundwater, by its very nature, cannot be confined within the arbitrarily determined
boundaries of a parcel of property. See Michele Engel, Comment, Water Quality
Control: The Reality of Priority in Utah Groundwater Management, 1992 Utah L. Rev.
491, 497 (1992) ("Groundwater flows along a natural gradient from the point of recharge
to a point of natural discharge ....").
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provides that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just
compensation.11 U.S. Const, amend. V. "Under the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the fifth amendment, a 'taking' does not require complete destruction of
the value of the property." Farmers New World Life, 803 P.2d at 1247. Rather, "'[i]t is
the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the
damage is substantial, that determines ... whether it is a taking.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)).

In determining whether the invasion

constitutes a taking, the "essential inquiry is whether the injury to the claimant's property
is in the nature of a tortious invasion of his rights or rises to the magnitude of an
appropriation of some interest in his property permanently to the use of the Government."
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In Cress, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the
government's act of damming a creek, which in turn lowered the creek's water level to a
point below the plaintiffs milldam such that the plaintiff was no longer able to use the
water to generate sufficient power to run the mill, constituted a taking under the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 318, 330. In that same opinion, the Court also considered a separate
case in which the government's dam resulted in "frequent overflows of water from the
river" onto a portion of another plaintiffs land.

Id. at 318.

In holding that the

government's act of damming the river constituted a taking in both cases, the Court
declared, "[w]hile the government does not directly proceed to appropriate the title, yet it
takes away the use and value', when that is done it is of little consequence in whom the
fee may be vested." Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
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As in Cress, the City has taken away the use and value of the North Hayden
Group's property by physically preventing the North Hayden Group members from
beneficially using their water rights on their lands.6 So long as the City continues to
pump from the Hayden Well Field wells at its current rate, thereby mining the unconfmed
aquifer, the water applied to the North Hayden Group's farm and pasture lands will
continue to sink deep underground to replenish the water taken by the City from the
aquifer, rather than traveling horizontally to irrigate the lands. Consequently, the North
Hayden Group will continue to be deprived of their right to beneficially use their water
on their land, and their once productive and fertile farm and pasture lands will remain
barren and unproductive. Pursuant to Farmers and Cress, this taking of the beneficial use
of the North Hayden Group's property rises to the magnitude of an appropriation of "the
use and value" of the Group's property to the use and benefit of the government. Thus,
this Court should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
City on the Group's takings claim and remand the cause for trial.
2. The District Court Erred in Dismissing the North Hayden Group's
Interference with Water Rights Claims because Roosevelt City's Conduct in
Continuously Pumping the Wells Has Created an Artificial Condition that
Results in Causing the Group's Water to Sink into the Ground to Replenish
the Depleted Aquifer,
By continuously pumping its wells, the City has created an artificial condition
within the lands that directs the waters, which were intended to be used by the North

6

Additionally, as discussed above, pursuant to Riordan, the City's pumping of the nearsurface water underlying the North Hayden Group's properties constitutes a taking of the
waters to which the North Hayden Group is legally entitled. 203 P.2d at 929-30.
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Hayden Group to irrigate their properties, deep underground to replenish the depleted
aquifer. Because such conduct constitutes an interference with the Group's water rights,
the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the City.
a, Roosevelt City Is Liable for Interfering with Plaintiffs' Water Rights and
the Near-Surface Water Underlying Their Land
All water in the State of Utah, including groundwater, is the "property of the
public." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1.

However, rights to the beneficial use of any

unappropriated water in the State can be obtained by filing an application with the State
Engineer. See id. § 73-3-1. Those who are granted a water right from the State are
entitled to receive a specific quantity and quality of water from a certain water source,
which is measured and limited by the beneficial use of the water. See id § 73-1-3
("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of
water in this state.").
Utah courts have long recognized that "obstructing or hindering the quantity or
quality of an existing water right constitutes" an illegal interference and is remediable by
court action. See Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, \ 13, 144 P.3d 1147; see also Salt
Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, f 28 n.10, 5 P.3d 1206 ("Generally,
the inquiry regarding interference focuses on actual interference in the quantity or quality
of the water to which the prior appropriator is entitled."). Moreover, Utah courts have
also held that a water right holder's right to the "continue[d] use of his [or her] existing
and historical method of diverting the water" is also protected from interference.
Wayment, 2006 UT 56 at \ 13. Indeed, in Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 114 P. 147 (Utah
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1911), this Court held as follows:
If all rights can be protected and preserved, a mere change in prior
established means or methods of diversion, if possible, ought not to prevent
the use of water which could otherwise not be beneficially applied. But, in
our judgment, the risk of interfering with prior rights and the cost of any
change in the prior appropriator's means or methods of diversion should be
assumed and borne by the subsequent appropriator ....
Id at 153.
Unlike the typical cases addressing illegal interference with diversion of water
rights, the taking of the North Hayden Group's water is less direct, but equally effective.
Water used for irrigation ends up being pumped by the City's wells for use by the City.
Also, the City's actions in pumping the five wells in the Hayden Well Field has decreased
the aquifer's level by at least 80 feet and has thereby created the large artificial cone of
depression interfering with the North Hayden Group members' beneficial use of the
water to which they are entitled.

Although this type of interference is one of first

impression in Utah, it is exceptionally similar to Utah cases in which a claim for

7

Although this type of interference is one of first impression in Utah, it has been long
recognized that aquifer mining can interfere with surface water rights. See Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976) (applying the implied-reservation-of-waterrights doctrine to surface water rights when the evidence showed that the "federal water
rights," which consisted of surface water, were being depleted by the plaintiffs' pumping
of groundwater because "the [groundwater and surface water are physically interrelated
as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle." (internal quotations omitted)); see also Susan
Batty Peterson, Note, Designation and Protection of Critical Groundwater Areas, 1991
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1393, 1395 (1991) ("Groundwater mining is a serious concern because its
results are often undesirable. Problems caused by prolonged overdraft include surface
land subsidence, reduction of basin storage capacity through impaction, water quality
degradation through contaminant migration and saline intrusion, [and] interference with
senior surface water rights ...." (emphasis added)).
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interference with water rights is raised in the context of an artesian or flowing well.
In Current Creek Irr. Co. v. Andrews, 344 P.2d 528 (Utah 1959), this Court was
faced with the question similar to the one currently before it. In that case, Current Creek
Irrigation Company applied for and received approval to drill five wells in a basin which
was "classified as a sensitive cone of influence, because the wells readily affect each
other." Id. at 529-30. The Court articulated the issue before it as follows:
The central problem is whether prior appropriators of water from an
underground basin, who receive it by means of flowing wells and springs,
have a vested right to continue receiving water by artesian pressure; and
whether subsequent appropriators, whose withdrawals of water lower the
water table and reduce the flow of prior wells, must restore the pressure or
bear the expense of replacing the water of prior appropriators.
Id. at 529.
In concluding that the prior apprioriators' right to the static head pressure was
protected, the Court declared, "all of our decisions have protected the rights to have the
static head pressure maintained. We have consistently enjoined the lowering of the static
head pressure which had the effect of preventing a prior user from continuing a
beneficial use of underground waters." Id. at 531 (emphasis added). Although the Court
subsequently modified its holding in Current Creek by adopting a "rule of
reasonableness," which requires that "the means of diversion must be reasonable and
consistent with the state of development of water in the area and not such as to abort the

8

"Artesian wells are generally thought of as artificial wells in which water from the
lower stratum rises by its own pressure and flows continuously above the surface of the
ground" due to the hydrostatic pressure caused by the formation of the strata of earth or
rock. 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters § 212 (2008).
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declared purpose of the law of putting all of available water to use," Wayman v. Murray
City Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 866 (Utah 1969), a defendant who interferes with a plaintiffs
ability to receive the beneficial use of his or her water may still be held liable if the
plaintiffs means of diversion is reasonable. Id.
In this case, the members of the North Hayden Group have historically used flood
irrigation as the method of irrigation of their properties.9 (R. 264-65.) However, when
the City began pumping the Hayden wells and drawing water from the shallow,
unconfined aquifer, the City caused an artificial condition underneath the North Hayden
Group's properties to occur wherein a large cone of depression was created which has the
effect of capturing and intercepting irrigation waters applied to the overlying lands and
drawing that water down through the ground to replenish the waters taken from the
aquifer. (R. 198.) Because Roosevelt City's pumping of the aquifer has reduced the
level of the aquifer at least 80 feet, (R. 198-200), waters applied to the lands are directed
past the shallow root zone of the crops, grasses, or vegetation existing on the surface in
order to recharge the substantially lowered water table.
As in Current Creek, the City's conduct has the effect of preventing the North
Hayden Group, prior users, from continuing a beneficial use of their water by their
historical method of diversion.10

Indeed, even after North Hayden Group member

Flood irrigation consists of causing water to flow across the irrigated land, typically
through flirrows adjacent to the crops.
10
Additionally, pursuant to Riordan, the City's pumping of the groundwater constitutes
direct interference with the water that has historically sub-irrigated the North Hayden
Group's properties and has sustained plant life on those properties. 203 P.2d at 929-30.
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Howard Horrocks installed a $100,000.00 sprinkling system, he is still unable to receive
the same beneficial use of his water rights as he did before the City began mining the
aquifer. (R. 264.) Because the undisputed evidence presented establishes that the City's
conduct in draining the unconfmed aquifer has interfered with the North Hayden Group's
ability to beneficially use their water rights, the North Hayden Group is entitled to
recover the damages caused by the City's interference with their water rights and the
near-surface water associated with their land. See Kano v. Arcon Corp., 326 P.2d 719,
721-22 (Utah 1958); see also Riordan, 203 P.2d at 929-30.
Moreover, pursuant to Gardner, Roosevelt City is also liable to the North Hayden
Group for all costs incurred by them to change the historical method of application of the
water due to the City's interference. The City, a junior appropriator, applied to change
the point of diversion of its water rights in 1985 so that it could pump its water from the
five Hayden Well Field wells. (R. 267.) This change in diversion and the resulting
production of the Hayden Well Field wells by the City has lowered the water table,
which, in turn, has essentially prevented the North Hayden Group from flood irrigating
their lands. (R. 263-66.) Consequently, the only method of irrigating their lands now
available to the Group is sprinkling. Even then, the sprinkling is less effective than the
historic flood irrigation. As stated in Gardner, all costs incurred in changing the historic
method of application should be borne by the junior appropriator that has caused the
interference. 114 P. at 153. Thus, the City is liable for all damages sustained by the
North Hayden Group as a result of the City's interference and for all costs incurred by the
Group in installing and developing pressurized sprinkler irrigation systems.
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i. The Rights of the City and the North Hayden Group Must Be Balanced
Despite the fact that the record showed Roosevelt's conduct has interfered with the
Group's water rights and ability to beneficially use their water rights, the district court
nevertheless granted summary judgment in favor of the City, reasoning as follows: "The
[Group's] interference claim fails for one simple reason. If the [c]ourt were to accept the
[Group's] argument, it would allow the [Group] to control indirectly water which they
have no right to control directly." (R. 299). However, a review of the law in Utah
establishes the fallacy of the district court's overly simplistic reasoning.
The law in Utah, consistently applied to land and water rights alike,11 holds that a
property owner's rights in his or her property are not "absolute." Rowell v. State Bd. of
Agriculture, 99 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1940) (Wolfe, J., dissenting in part) ("[N]either property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to
work them harm."); see also KM. Long & Co. v. Cannon-Papanikolas Constr. Co., 343
P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1959) ("[I]t requires little imagination to realize that rights to use
property cannot be absolute. If one holds property by force alone he is always subject to
being dispossessed by force. If he holds it by rule of law this involves the agreement of
everyone else. To the extent they are required to respect his rights, he must similarly
respect theirs."); Wayman, 458 P.2d at 865 ("All users are required where necessary to
employ reasonable and efficient means in taking their own waters in relation to others to
1l

It should be noted that, under Utah law, water rights are treated as real property. See
Utah Dept. of Trans, v. G. Kay, Inc., 2003 UT 40, f 15, 78 P3d 612 (recognizing that
"[w]ater rights are a type of interest in real property").
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the end that wastage of water is avoided and that the greatest amount of available water is
put to beneficial use."). Instead, "every person has a right to use his own property as he
sees fit so long as that use does not invade the rights of his neighbor unreasonably and
substantiallyr

Johnson v. Mt. Ogden Enters., Inc., 460 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1969)

(emphasis added).12
Because property rights are not absolute, adjacent property owners are in actuality
allowed to "control indirectly" property to which "they have no right to control directly."
For example, under the doctrine of private nuisance, a neighboring property owner is
allowed to control indirectly the activities that a property owner may conduct on his or
her own land. See id. (upholding judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, neighboring
property owners, based on a finding that the defendant's operation of a drive-in theater
constituted a nuisance because such use of the defendant's property "tended to
substantially and unreasonably interfere with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their property");
see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1101(1) ("A nuisance is anything which is injurious to
health, indecent, offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so
as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property...."). This Court has
also held that adjoining landowners sharing a common support wall are not free to do as
they wish with their buildings but rather must "use the highest possible care to prevent
and avoid such injury which may be caused as the natural and proximate result of his
~ This principle of law has actually been codified in Utah's law water. For example,
section 73-3-20 expressly provides that "[a]ny person having stored his appropriated
water in a reservoir for a beneficial purpose shall be permitted to withdraw the water at
the times and in the quantities as his necessities may require if the withdrawal does not
interfere with the rights of others" Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-20(1) (emphasis added).
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building operations." Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First Nat Bldg. Co., 57 P.2d 1099, 1117
(Utah 1936).
In KM. Long & Co., the plaintiffs and the defendants each presented a claim of
absolute rights similar to that embraced by the district court in this case. 343 P.2d at
1102. The plaintiffs there claimed that they were entitled to an "absolute right to the
possession and use of subterranean waters and in insisting upon maintaining it
unimpaired," while the defendants claimed that they had "the right to put their land to
normal and ordinary uses" by installing a drainage system, even if that system
"impairfed] the plaintiffs' claimed rights." Id. In addressing the competing interests of
the plaintiffs and the defendants, the Court declared as follows:
When conflicts of this character arise it is necessary to give consideration to
the basic purposes for which property is possessed as established by the
customs and practices of people in the use of property of similar character.
It is the policy of the law to recognize the propriety of such uses and
encourage the improvement of property so that it may be put to its best
advantage.
Id.
Recognizing that the defendants' land would remain a swamp if they were not
allowed to install the drains, the Court held that the defendants "were entitled to make
ordinary and reasonable uses of their property so long as they did so with due care and
not in violation of the principles herein set forth [i.e., are not negligent or reckless with
respect to the plaintiffs water supply in the installation of their drains]." Id. at 1103.
Such a holding, the Court declared, "accords with the salutary public policy of
encouraging the development of property for [a] useflil purpose." Id.
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In this case, the evidence established that the City did not act reasonably or with
due care in developing and pumping the Hayden Well Field wells. Instead of simply
drilling deeper to reach the confined Duchesne River Formation and installing nonperforated casings for the portion of their wells within the Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer, the
City designed each of its wells to draw water directly from the unconfined, shallow
Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer.

(R. 198-200, 267-68.)

The evidence also shows that

Roosevelt City was aware that the development of its first three wells had caused the
water table to decrease significantly within a matter of only six years, as shown by the
Well Driller Reports filed in 1990, which reported that the water level had dropped to as
low as 83 feet. (R. 267-68.) Yet Roosevelt City continued to develop an additional two
wells and then began pumping from all five of the Hayden Well Field wells.
Had Roosevelt City's wells been designed to draw water from the confined
Duchesne River Formation, the City would have been able to divert and use all of the
water to which it is entitled without affecting the water level of the unconfined aquifer
and without creating the artificial condition that now causes the Group's surface waters to
be diverted downward to replenish the depleted aquifer. Such a reasonable course of
action would have allowed both the City and the North Hayden Group to enjoy the
benefits of their respective property rights. However, because the City chose instead to
draw its water from the unconfined aquifer and continued to develop new wells despite
the drop in the water table, it has exercised its rights to the detriment of the North Hayden
Group. Such conduct is clearly prohibited under Utah law.
Moreover, it should be noted that the direct result of Roosevelt City's conduct in
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draining the aquifer is that lands that were once fertile and productive have been rendered
barren. As stated in NM. Long & Co., when competing property interests are before the
Court, "[i]t is the policy of the law to recognize" the purposes for which the property is
used and to "encourage the improvement of [the] property so that it may be put to its best
advantage." 343 P.2d at 1102. It is evident that to allow Roosevelt City to continue to
drain the unconfined aquifer, which will continue the transformation of land that was
historically fertile and productive to a dry, barren dustbowl, is not in conformity with the
policy of the law, especially given the fact that it is not necessary for Roosevelt City to
drain the unconfined aquifer in order to obtain the water to which it is entitled. Because
damage to the North Hayden Group's water rights and lands can be avoided merely by
the City drawing its water from the lower, confined Duchesne River Formation, this
Court should hold that the district court erred in finding that the City cannot be held liable
for interfering with the Group's surface water rights. Thus, this Court should reverse the
district court's order and remand the cause for trial.
b. The Dewatering of an Aquifer Under One's Water Rights Is Contrary to
Public Policy
It should be noted that the ruling of the district court, if affirmed and adopted as
law in Utah, would have a substantial adverse impact on this State and its ability to
prevent the mining of aquifers, such as that sought by the Southern Nevada Water
Authority. The Southern Nevada Water Authority has proposed to pipe up to 50,000 acre
feet of water from the aquifer underlying the Snake Valley, which is divided by the UtahNevada border.

See Petitioners' Opening Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial
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Review, filed January 5, 2009, in the Seventh Judicial District Court of White Pine
County, Nevada (hereinafter "Nevada State Court Petition").
The Utah Legislature and both Salt Lake and Utah County are actively seeking to
delay or prevent the withdrawal of the groundwater in Snake Valley, citing concerns
regarding the predicted impact on the lands in Snake Valley and downwind along the
Wasatch Front. See Josh Loftin, Western Desert Resolution Urges Input on Water Plan,
DESERET MORNING NEWS,

September 21, 2006, at B04, 2006 WLNR 16358603; Patty

Henetz, SL, Utah Counties Appeal Nevada's Snake Valley Water Grab, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, August 7, 2008, 2008 WLNR 14788591; Nevada State Court Petition at 4.
Indeed, in September of 2006, the Utah Legislature's Natural Resources,
Agriculture and Environment Interim Committee approved a resolution calling for
"scientific studies about the impact of removing the water from the aquifer[]" located in
Snake Valley.

See Loftin, Western Desert Resolution Urges Input on Water Plan,

DESERET MORNING NEWS, at B04. The Utah Legislature subsequently passed the Joint
Resolution Regarding Action on Groundwater in Snake Valley during the 2007 General
Session, recognizing that the aquifer underlying Snake Valley "is the source of the
springs, seeps, and wells that support the citizens' livelihoods and fragile ecosystem in
Snake Valley and other areas of western Utah." See H.J.R.l, at 2 (Utah 2007). The
resolution urged the Governor to "carefully assess the groundwater development project's
potential economic, social, and environmental consequences in Utah, including assessing
impacts to indigenous flora and fauna and modeling groundwater behavior under any
proposed pumping plan."
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And, in 2009, the Legislature passed and the
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Governor signed House Bill 120, which creates the Snake Valley Aquifer Research Team
and Advisory Council to compile research regarding the impact of the proposed plan on
"surface water and groundwater," "agriculture," and "soils." H.B. 120, 1, 5 (Utah 2009).
In addition to the Utah Legislature's attempts to prevent mining of the aquifer
underlying Snake Valley, both Salt Lake and Utah County have also taken action to
respond to the Nevada proposal. Specifically, the counties have filed a petition with the
Nevada district court, seeking a reversal of the Nevada State Engineer's decision denying
the counties "interested person" status. Nevada State Court Petition at 6-9. The counties'
petition is based on the following: "If [the Snake Valley Applications] are granted and
significant groundwater pumping occurs in Snake Valley, that would likely cause the
groundwater tables to drop significantly enough to destroy the groundwater dependent
vegetation in Snake Valley, thus creating a dust bowl." Id. at 4. The fate of the counties'
Petition has yet to be decided by the Nevada courts.
If the district court's ruling is upheld and an appropriator in Utah is legally entitled
to deplete an aquifer, regardless of the detrimental affects on the environment or the
damage sustained by surrounding properties, it is unlikely that the State of Utah would be
able to prevent the environmental consequences that have occurred in this case and that
are expected to occur if Nevada is allowed to dewater the Snake Valley aquifer.
3. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Governmental Immunity Act
Barred the North Hayden Group's Interference Claims because the City
Was Negligent in Installing Wells that, due to their Depth and Perforated
Casings, Tap Into the Unconfined Aquifer Below the Group's Lands and
Therefore Dewater the Group's Lands.
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The district court erred in holding that the North Hayden Group's interference
claims were barred by the Governmental Immunity Act because the evidence presented to
the district court establishes that Roosevelt City was negligent in installing defective
and/or dangerous wells that are designed to deplete the unconfined aquifer. Accordingly,
this Court should reverse the district court and remand the case for trial.
Section 63-30d-201 of the Utah Code provides that "[e]xcept as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter, each governmental entity and each employee of a governmental
entity are immune from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of a
governmental function."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-201(l) (2004).13

Although

"governmental function" is broadly defined as "each activity, undertaking, or operation
of a governmental entity," id. § 63-30d-102(4)(a), the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
("Act") has nevertheless waived immunity for certain injuries, including "any injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment." Id. § 63-30d-3Ql(4).
While the district court recognized that the Act waives immunity for injuries
resulting from negligent acts or omissions, (R. 298), it nevertheless held that the North
Hayden Group's Interference claim is barred by the Act because the Complaint did not
allege negligence but instead alleged that Roosevelt's activities were "intentional, willful,
and malicious, or at least manifested a knowing and reckless indifference for and

Because the Governmental Immunity Act has been amended since the filing of the
North Hayden Group's Complaint, this brief will refer to the 2004 version of the Act,
which was in place at the time the Complaint was filed.
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disregard of the [Group's] rights in their property."

(R. 297-98.) However, merely

alleging that the City's activities manifested a knowing and reckless indifference for and
disregard of the Group's rights does not take Roosevelt City's conduct out of the realm of
negligent conduct.

Rather, as stated by this Court, negligent conduct may include

conduct that manifests a "knowing and reckless indifference toward the rights of others."
Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ^| 29, 63 P.3d 686; see also Smith v.
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, Tj 27, 82 P.3d 1064 ("'While simple negligence will not
support punitive damages, negligence manifesting a knowing and reckless indifference
toward the rights of others will.'" (quoting Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT 129 at \ 29).
Thus, section 63-30d-301(4) is applicable, and the district court's finding that the
Complaint did not allege negligence should be reversed.
This Court should also reverse the district court's finding that section 63-30d301(3)(a)(ii) does not apply in this case. That section provides that, independent of the
waiver of immunity for negligent conduct, immunity is also waived for any injury

14

The district court also held that "[t]here is no evidence offered that would tend to show
that the pumping was negligent." (R. 297.) However, it should be noted that Roosevelt
City only challenged the fact that the Complaint did not allege negligent conduct.
Roosevelt City did not argue that the evidence could not support a finding of negligence.
(R. 166-67.) Thus, the ruling of the district court that "no evidence [was] offered that
would tend to show that the pumping was negligent" was beyond the issues raised in the
motion. Additionally, that ruling was erroneous in that the Group specifically discussed
the duty owed by Roosevelt City and its subsequent breach of that duty by designing
wells to pump from the unconfined, shallow aquifer rather than the confined Duchesne
River Formation. (R. 242-45.) Because Roosevelt City's conduct in depleting the water
table is unreasonable in light of the fact that it could easily obtain its water by simply
drilling its wells deeper and using non-perforated casings in the unconfined aquifer, the
evidence presented to the district court did in fact show that the City's conduct in
pumping the wells was negligent.
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"caused by: . . . any defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, dam,
reservoir, or other public improvement." Id. § 63-30d-301(3)(a)(ii). "The word 'injury'
means 'damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his
person, or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.'"
Williams v. Carbon County Bd ofEduc, 780 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1989) (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5) (1988)). Although not defined in the Act, the term "defective" is
commonly defined as "falling below the norm in structure or in mental or physical
function." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 333 (9th ed. 1983). Similarly,
although not included as a defined term in the Act, the term "dangerous" is commonly
known to mean "able or likely to inflict injury." Id. at 324.
Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the
North Hayden Group, the non-moving party, Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin,
Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984), the evidence presented to
the district court establishes that the dramatic decrease in the water table is a direct result
of the fact that the City's wells, due to their depth and perforations, tap into the
unconfined aquifer rather than the confined Duchesne River Formation. 15 (R. 198-200,

15

The well owner controls the location at which water is drawn from a well through the
depth of the well and the casing of the well. Well casings consist of a water proof pipe
that lines the well to control the depth from which the well draws water. In fact, Utah
drinking water regulations require that all culinary wells be cased for at least the first 100
feet. See Utah Admin. Code R309-515-6(6)(h).
The floor of the unconfined aquifer underlying the North Hayden area is approximately
190 feet below ground surface. In addition to failing to drill beyond the unconfined
aquifer into the Duchesne River Formation, a confined aquifer, Roosevelt City also
perforated the casings of each of its wells, thereby ensuring that the water it pumped
would be drawn from the unconfined, shallow aquifer. (R. 199-201.)
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263-64.) This defective design in the manner in which the City wells were drilled and
cased causes the City wells to deplete the unconfined aquifer sitting directly below the
Group's property.

(R. 198-200.)

Moreover, because the depletion of the aquifer

resulting from the defective design and construction of the wells has caused damage to
the Group's properties, the wells have inflicted injury and are likely to continue to inflict
injury, thereby qualifying as a dangerous condition. Thus, section 63-30d-301(3)(a)(ii)
does apply, and immunity is waived for all of the Group's injuries incurred as a result of
the City's defective and dangerous wells. Consequently, the district court's ruling should
be reversed and the case remanded.
4. The District Court Erred in Finding that the City Did Not Have a Duty to
Refrain from Diverting Water in a Manner that Was Injurious to the North
Hayden Group.
The district court also concluded that the North Hayden Group's negligence claim
should be dismissed because Roosevelt City did not have a duty to refrain from using its
property in a manner that is injurious to others. However, that conclusion is clearly
contrary to Utah law. As discussed above, the law in Utah provides that a land owner has
a duty to refrain from using his own property in such a manner that would injure others.
See AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315, 322-23 (Utah
1997) ("A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for physical
harm caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land, which the possessor
realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of such harm, if (a) the
possessor has created the condition . . . ." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
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364)); see also Johnson v. Mt. Ogden Enters., Inc., 460 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1969) ("It is
recognized that every person has a right to use his own property as he sees fit so long as
that use does not invade the rights of his neighbor unreasonably and substantially."). And
this duty extends to water right holders as well. See Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Gunnison
Highland Canal Co., 174 P. 852, 855 (Utah 1918) ("A priority to the use of water is a
property right, which is the subject of purchase and sale, and its character and method of
use may be changed, provided such change does not injuriously affect the rights of
others"' (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
In addition to the general duty of property owners to refrain from using their
property in a manner that would harm others, section 73-1-8 of the Utah Code imposes an
affirmative statutory duty on "[t]he owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse
[to] maintain the same in repair so as to prevent . . . damage to the property of others."
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 (2004). In interpreting this language, this Court has held that
section 73-1-8 imposes "a statutory duty upon users" to exercise that degree of care
"which persons of ordinary intelligence and prudence would observe under the particular
circumstances." Erickson v. Bennion, 503 P.2d 139, 140 (Utah 1972). The Court has
also held that "the degree of care increases in proportion to the hazards to be anticipated."
Id.; see also Dougherty v. California-Pacific Utils. Co., 546 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1976).
Pursuant to both Utah common law and section 73-1-8, Roosevelt City owed a
duty to the North Hayden Group members to drill, case, and operate its wells in such a
manner as to prevent harm to the Group's properties. The City breached this duty, first,
by failing to drill the wells deep enough to reach into the confined Duchesne River
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Formation and instead by drawing its water from the unconfined Neola White-Rocks
Aquifer, and, second, by continuing to pump the wells after learning that the production
of the Hayden Well Field wells dramatically reduced the water table and resulted in the
dewatering of the North Hayden Group's properties. Thus, Roosevelt City is liable to the
North Hayden Group for the injuries they incurred as a result of its negligence.
In ruling that, as a matter of law, Roosevelt City did not owe the North Hayden
Group a duty to refrain from using its property in a manner that would injure or harm the
Group, the district court declared, "[a]gain, if the [c]ourt were to accept the [Group's]
negligence argument, it would allow the [Group] to control indirectly water which they
had no right to control directly. In effect, accepting the [Group's] negligence argument
would usurp the appropriation laws of this State." (R. 294.) But, as discussed supra Part
2(a), such a conclusion is clearly contrary to Utah law. Because the law expressly limits
a property owner's rights to use his or her property when such use detrimentally and
substantially invades the rights of others, the district court erred in dismissing the
Group's claims solely on the basis that the City lawfully held title to the water rights.
5. The District Court Erred in Refusing to Find that the City's Pumping of Its
Wells Constitutes a Continuous Tort When the Facts Showed that, by
Continuing Its Conduct, the City Is Increasing the Extent of the Group's
Property Damages
The continuous tort rule applies to Roosevelt City's ongoing pumping of the
Hayden Well Field wells, which is further increasing the damage to the North Hayden
Group's properties. It is a well-established rule that, in the case of a continuous tort, such
as is occurring here, "the statute of limitations runs from the date of each wrong or from
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the end of the continuing wrongful conduct." 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 168;
see also Hensley v. City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[A] continuous
violation exists if: (1) the defendants engage in continuing wrongful conduct; (2) injury
to the plaintiffs accrues continuously; and (3) had the defendants at any time ceased their
wrongful conduct further injury would have been avoided.").
This rule, commonly referred to as the continuous tort rule, has been adopted and
applied by Utah courts in vastly varying circumstances. For example, this Court has
applied the rule to toll the statute of limitations for continuing nuisances or trespasses.
See Breiggar Properties, L.C v. HE. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53, f 8, 52 P.3d 1133
("[I]n the case of a continuing trespass or nuisance, the person injured may bring
successive actions for damages until the nuisance [or trespass] is abated, even though an
action based on the original wrong may be barred . . . ." (alterations in original) (internal
quotations omitted).) Also, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that the continuous tort
rule is applicable to Title VII claims and claims for infliction of emotional distress. See
Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378,ffi[42, 44, 102 P.3d 774.
Utah's courts have also applied the continuous tort rule to medical malpractice
claims, holding "[u]nder the continuous negligent treatment rule, where a patient is
injured by a course of continuing negligent treatment by a health care provider, the cause
of action does not accrue until the date of the final negligent act." Harper v. Evans, 2008
UT App 165, T| 10, 185 P.3d 573. Finally, this Court has recognized that the continuous
tort rule would also apply to "suits for infringement of patent that presupposes
ownership." Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257-58 (Utah 1983).
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In Brieggar Properties, this Court discussed the differences between a continuing
tort and a permanent tort as it applied to the law of trespass and nuisance. It held that
when determining whether the continuous tort rule should apply, the court should look at
the act that constitutes the wrongful conduct, not the harm resulting from the act. See
Breiggar Props., 2002 UT 53 at ^f 10. If multiple wrongfiil acts occur and continue to
occur, "the statute of limitations begins to run anew with each act." Id. at f 11.
However, "recovery is limited to actual injury suffered within the three years [the period
of limitation] prior to commencement of each action." Id.
In its ruling, the district court declared that it was unaware of any Utah court that
has applied the continuing tort or continuing violation rule to causes of action for
interference, negligence, or takings. (R. 293.) However, this statement is incorrect.
Indeed, in opposing Roosevelt City's motion for summary judgment, the North Hayden
Group referred the district court to the Utah Court of Appeals opinion in Harper v.
Evans, 2008 UT App 165, 185 P.3d 573, in which the court applied the "continuous
negligent treatment rule" to address instances in which "a patient is injured by a course of
continuing negligent treatment by a health care provider." Id. at % 10 (emphasis added).
(R. 241.) Thus, contrary to the district court's statements, Utah's courts have previously
applied the continuous tort rule to negligence actions.
The district court also refused to apply the continuous tort rule to the Group's
claims because it stated that the Group failed to show why the rule was applicable. (R.
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292-93.) But the facts and briefing

presented to the district court clearly showed that

Roosevelt's ongoing wrongful conduct in mining the aquifer is resulting in additional
damages and injury to the Group's properties that could be prevented if Roosevelt were
enjoined from continuing to pump from the shallow, unconfined aquifer. (R. 240-42.)
It is undisputed that Roosevelt City has been pumping the five wells located in the
Hayden Well Field from at least 1990 to the present. (R. 265-66.) It is also undisputed
that the City's pumping of the wells is increasing the extent of property damaged by the
decreasing water table. (R. 263.) Indeed, as the City continues to pump from the Hayden
Well Field wells each year, the water level of the aquifer continues to decrease and the
damage to the North Hayden Group's lands continues to increase.17 (R. 240,263.)
The evidence shows that the North Hayden Group did not sustain permanent
damages to their property at the time the City drilled each of the Hayden Well Field
wells. Nor did the Group sustain permanent damages when the City began pumping the
wells, The damages to the North Hayden Group's properties are directly related to the
City's ongoing use of the wells, and further damages can be prevented if the City ceases
its pumping activities.18 Therefore, because the wrongful act is ongoing in nature and

16

As noted above, the district court did not hear oral argument on the City's motion.
This is so because the lower the aquifer decreases, the further the cone of depression
extends, which captures and diverts the surface waters underground. Therefore, when the
aquifer's level had decreased only 25 feet, less of the Group's surface waters were used
to replenish the aquifer. However, now that the aquifer's level has dropped over 80 feet,
a significantly higher portion of the Group's surface waters are trapped in the cone of
depression and redirected far beneath the surface level.
18
Aquifers are recognized as being dynamic in that there is recharge and discharge of
water in the aquifer. Over time, without the pumping of the wells, the Neola-Whiterocks
Aquifer will recharge.
17
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continues to cause additional damages to the Group, the statute of limitations "begins to
run anew with each act" or at "the end of the continuing wrongful conduct," and the
North Hayden Group is entitled to recover their damages incurred within the last four
years prior to the commencement of this action.19
It should be noted that application of the continuous tort rule to the Group's claims
is consistent with this Court's application of the rule to temporary nuisance and trespass
claims. Each of the North Hayden Group's claims is based on Roosevelt City's conduct
of interfering with the Group's water rights and of depriving the Group of their ability to
beneficially use their water rights. Such conduct in and of itself supports a common law
claim for trespass and/or nuisance. See Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704
P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1985) (u[A]n actor who interferes with the normal flow of surface
waters across another's land may be liable to the other under the general rules applicable
to private nuisance."); see also 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters § 10 ("Any wrongful and direct
interference with the rights of another in the possession of water rights constitutes a
trespass or tort. A wrongful interference with rights in respect to waters may also
constitute a nuisance."). Thus, the legal reasoning supporting the application of the
continuous tort rule in the case of a continuing trespass or nuisance is equally applicable
to the City's continuing interference with the Group's right to beneficially use their water
rights. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court and hold that the continuous
tort rule applies to each of the Group's causes of action.

19

The four year statute of limitation found in section 78B-2-307(3) is applicable to each
of the Group's claims.
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CONCLUSION
The question that is before the Court is whether Roosevelt City, a property owner,
has the unfettered right to use its property in any manner it sees fit, even if such use
results in harm to others. The answer to this question has been addressed by this Court
on several occasions: the City's right to use the water it has lawfully appropriated is not
absolute; rather, the City must exercise due care and divert its water in a reasonable
manner. Because the undisputed evidence shows that the City did not exercise due care
and was not reasonable when it designed its wells to pump from the shallow, unconfmed
aquifer rather than ensuring that its wells would draw water from the deeper, confined
Duchesne River Formation, this Court should hold that the City was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's
grant of summary judgment and hold that (1) the North Hayden Group has a legally
protectable property interest in their property, near-surface water, and the right to
beneficially use their surface water rights; (2) the North Hayden Group has stated a claim
for interference based on Roosevelt City's conduct, which has depleted the aquifer and
created an artificial condition in the land that is depriving the Group of their water rights;
(3) Roosevelt City is not immune from liability under the Governmental Immunity Act;
(4) Roosevelt City owes a duty to refrain from using its property in a manner that
substantially and unreasonably harms others; and (5) the statute of limitations does not
bar any of the Group's causes of action.
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DATED this 7th day of May, 2009.
SMITH HARTVIGSEN,

PLLC

J. Craig Smith
J
Kathryn J. Steffey
Bryan C. Bryner
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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David L. Church
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ADDENDUM
A. Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
B. Nevada State Court Petition
C. Deseret Morning News, September 21, 2006, "Western Desert Resolution
Urges Input on Water Plan"
D. The Salt Lake Tribune, August 7, 2008, "Salt Lake, Utah Counties Appeal
Nevada's Snake Valley Water Grab"
E. Joint Resolution Regarding Action on Groundwater in Snake Valley
F. Snake Valley Aquifer Research Team and Advisory Council
G. U.S. Const, amend V
H. Utah Const art. I, sec. 22
I. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-201, (2004)
J. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-301, (2004)
K. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 (2004)
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
\2 i ^
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H ^ ° ^ % J k y <00$

^Ory
Melvin Bingham, et al.,

RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Roosevelt City Corporation, a Utah municipal
corporation,

Case No. 040800250WA
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendant.

This matter is before the court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to render summary
jiidgment if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law."
Undisputed Facts
1. Plaintiffs Melvin and Glenda Bingham own property located in Uintah and Duchesne
Counties and have leased water rights from the Uintah and Ouray Project. (Complaint % 1).
2. Plaintiffs Howard Horrocks and Ila Fay Horrocks own property located in Uintah
County, have been issued water rights by the Division of Water Rights of the State of Utah, and
have leased water rights from the Uintah and Ouray Project. (Complaint % 2).
3. Plaintiff Virginia Houston, as Trustee of the Virginia Coltharp Houston Living Trust,
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owns property in Duchesne and Uintah Counties, is the owner of shares of Uinta Independent
Ditch Company and Dry Gulch Irrigation Company stock, and has leased water rights from
Uintah and Ouray Project. (Complaint f 3).
4. Plaintiffs Fern Oberhansly Labrum, as Trustee of the Mark L. Oberhansly Trust, owns
property in Uintah County, owns shares of the Uinta Independent Ditch Company stock, and has
leased water rights from the Uintah and Ouray Project. (Complaint f 4).
5. Plaintiffs George and Loraine Richins lease property in Uintah County, own shares of
Uinta Independent Ditch Company stock, and have leased water rights from the Uintah and
Ouray Project. (Complaint f 6).
6. Plaintiffs Loraine Richins and Phyliss D. Oberhansly, as Trustees of the Phyllis D.
Oberhansly Trust, own property in Uintah County. (Complaint ^ 7).
7. None of the Plaintiffs allege that they have water rights, approved by the office of the
Utah State Engineer, to the water located in the water table below their property. (Complaint ^[
1-8).
8. Roosevelt City Corporation is a municipality of the State of Utah located in Duchesne
County. (Complaint T[ 8).
9. Roosevelt City holds water rights and operates wells on property located in Duchesne
and Uintah Counties. (Complaint % 8).
10. Roosevelt City's application for a water right to supply municipal water was first
approved in 1958. (Complaint^ 11).
11. Roosevelt City's application for water right to supply municipal water was approved
in 1961. (Complaint^ 12).
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12. Roosevelt purchased land previously owned by Verl and Leah Haslem. (Complaint f
15).
13. In 1983 Verl and Leah Haslem assigned their interest in water rights to Roosevelt
City. (Complaint^ 15).
14. Roosevelt City filed various change applications for its water rights to utilize the
water at what is called in the complaint the "Hayden Well Field" and the applications were all
approved prior to May 6, 1994. (Complaint ^ 15-19).
15. By the fall of 1990 all five wells in the Hayden well field were producing water for
Roosevelt City. (Complaint ^ 20).
16. Plaintiffs allege that after development of the Hayden Well Field in the late 1980's
and 1990fs the trees and grass on their properties died and the Plaintiffs could no longer produce
hay as they had before. (Plaintiffs' answers to Interrogatory 12 of Defendant's First Set of
Discovery attached as Exhibit A hereto).
17. Plaintiffs' claims of interference with their water rights because of the pumping of
the Hayden Well Field has lowered the water table under the Plaintiffs' property which makes it
inefficient to water their respective properties with the water rights they either own or lease.
(Plaintiffs' answers to Interrogatories 12, 13, 14 of Defendant's First Set of Discovery attached
ap Exhibit A hereto).
18. The Complaint does not allege that Roosevelt City has used any water right or water
Source for which it does not have approved certificated water right through the office of the Utah
State Engineer. (See Complaintffi[11, 12,14, 15, 16, 17, 33, 34, and 35).
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Analysis
I. Interference with Water Rights
First, the Defendant argues that they have not interfered with the Plaintiffs' water rights.
The Plaintiffs allege two ways the Defendant has interfered with their water rights. First,
the Plaintiffs argue the Defendant has interfered with their right to the beneficial use of their
irrigation water. The Plaintiffs come to this conclusion by making the following connections: the
Defendant's use of the wells and pumping of water has lowered the water table under their land;
the lower water table has made the Plaintiffs' land drier; because the land is drier, the Plaintiffs'
irrigation water is not as efficient in irrigating the land. Consequently, the Plaintiffs claim that
the beneficial use of their irrigation water has been interfered with. Second, the Plaintiffs claim a
right to the groundwater that has subirrigated their land. The Plaintiffs argue the Defendant's
pumping has lowered the water table and consequently interfered with the water that has
historically subirrigated their property.
As to the last argument, the Plaintiffs rely on the holding in Riordan v. Westwood et al,
for their claim that they have rights to the water subirrigating their land. 203 P.2d 922 (Utah
1949). In Riordan, the Court held:
Where, as here, in its natural state water is diffused and percolates through the soil
so near the surface that without artificial diversion or application it produces plant
life and thereby beneficially affects the land, and where its course cannot be traced
onto the lands of any person other than the owner of the land where it is found, such
water is percolating waters and as such are a part of the soil, they are not public
waters, and the right to the use thereof cannot be acquired by appropriation under our
appropriation statute.
Id. at 929.
Under Riordan, certain percolating waters are not subject to appropriation. However, the
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water under the Plaintiffs' land is not the type of water that this holding applies to. The water
under the Plaintiffs property can be traced onto the lands of others besides the owner of the land
where it is found. Each individual Plaintiff landowner claims that the groundwater is found on
the^r land. Consequently, the underground aquifer traverses under the land of more than one
individual land owner. Therefore, the water is public water subject to appropriation. The
Plaintiffs do not have a right to the water that subirrigates their land, and their interference claim
on this basis is denied.
Next, the Plaintiffs' claim that the beneficial use of their irrigation water has been
interfered with by the Defendant. The Plaintiffs' interference claim fails for one simple reason.
If the Court were to accept the Plaintiffs' argument, it would allow the Plaintiffs to control
indirectly water which they have no right to control directly. The Plaintiffs clearly have no water
rights to the water under their land. The Defendant has appropriated this water under the laws of
this State. Accepting the Plaintiffs' beneficial use argument would allow the Plaintiffs to control
the ground water without ever taking the steps necessary to appropriate the water and establish
rights to it. That is contrary to the prior appropriation laws of this State.
Furthermore, the Defendant's use of the groundwater has not interfered with the
Plaintiffs water rights. The beneficial use the Plaintiffs are referring to is the historic efficiency
of their irrigation water to irrigate their land. However, their irrigation water was beneficial at
the historic levels only because of reliance on the underground water. The Plaintiffs' irrigation
water was sufficient to irrigate their land at historic levels only because it was supplemented with
the groundwater in which the Plaintiffs had no right to. In other words, the Plaintiffs were
irrigating their land with less water because they were relying on the groundwater to saturate
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their land. The Plaintiffs' irrigation water is the same as it was before the Defendant started
pumping. The difference is that the Plaintiffs are no longer able to supplement their irrigation
water with the groundwater which they did not have a right to.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs' interference claim fails as a matter of law. The Defendant's
Motion is granted as to this issue.
Alternatively, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' interference claim is barred by
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
"[E]ach governmental entity and each employee of a governmental entity are immune
from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of a government function." Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-7-201(l).
In Ledfors v. Emery County Sck Dist., the Court outlined the procedure for determining
whether a governmental entity is immune from suit. 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). The first
question is whether the governmental entity was performing a governmental function and
immune from suit. Id. Next, if it was a governmental function, was the immunity waived by
another section of the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. Finally, if the immunity was waived, is
there an exception in the Act that negates the waiver. Id.
Here, neither party disputes that the Defendant was performing a governmental function
and immune from suit under the first step. As the Defendant states, the basis for the claim
concerns the operation of a city water department. The Defendant's pumping and use of the
water is a governmental function and the Defendant is immune from suit.
The next step in the analysis is where the parties disagree. The Plaintiffs' complaint
alleges that the Defendant's actions were intentional, willful, and malicious, or at least
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manifested a knowing and reckless indifference for and disregard of the Plaintiffs' rights in their
property. The Defendant argues that while immunity may be waived for negligent conduct under
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4), there is no waiver for intentional or reckless conduct.
The Plaintiffs argue that alleging the Defendant's actions were intentional or reckless
does not rule out that they weren't also negligent. Alternatively, the Plaintiffs argue that Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(3)(b)(ii) also waives governmental immunity for injuries caused by a
defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public
improvement. The Plaintiffs allege that the injury was caused by the Defendant's use of
perforated casings in their wells, and by tapping into an unconfined aquifer instead of the
Duchesne River Formation.
First, the Plaintiffs complaint alleges that the Defendant intentionally or recklessly
pumped water from the Defendant's wells. There is no evidence offered that would tend to show
that the pumping was negligent. The Defendant intentionally pumped the water that the
Defendant had water rights to, from wells that the Defendant owned. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs'
claim that intentional or reckless conduct can include negligent conduct is unpersuasive. If
intentional and reckless conduct also included negligence, then it would make little sense for the
Legislature to draw a distinction for waiving immunity only for negligence.
Also, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(3)(b)(ii) does not apply to the facts here. There is no
evidence presented that the Defendant's wells were defective. The Plaintiffs merely state that the
Defendant used perforated casings for their wells. Apparently, the Plaintiffs conclude that
perforated casings are defective. The Plaintiffs fail to explain why the perforated casings are
defective. The Plaintiffs also fail to explain how the Defendant's act of drawing water from an
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unconfined aquifer instead of the Duchesne River formation was defective. The Plaintiffs merely
conclude that the act was defective without explaining how pumping water that the Defendant
has water rights to is defective.
Therefore, government immunity applies to the Plaintiffs' interference claim.
Governmental immunity was not waived under a specific section of the Act. The Defendant's
Motion for summary judgment as to this issue is granted.
II. Takings
Next, the Plaintiffs claim that the beneficial use of their water has been taken away by the
Defendant's pumping. The Plaintiffs argue that this is a compensable taking under both the Utah
and United States Constitutions.
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution states: "Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation."
A takings analysis under the Utah Constitution consists of the two steps. Strawberry
Electric Service Dist v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996). First, the plaintiff
must show they have some protectable property interest. Id. Second, if they have a protectable
property interest, the plaintiff must show that the interest has been taken or damaged by
government action. Id.
The Fifth Amendment of United States Constitution states: "Nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." A taking under the United States Constitution
requires an actual and permanent invasion that amounts to an "appropriation of and not merely an
injury to property." Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924).
Here, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs have no protectable property interest in the
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water rights they allege have been taken or damaged. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs
only have protectable water rights in irrigation water, not the water under their land.
The Plaintiffs argue that they have a protectable property interest in the beneficial use of
their irrigation water. The Plaintiffs claim that their irrigation water is no longer sufficient to
irrigate their land because the Defendant's pumping of the groundwater has lowered the water
table. Also, the Plaintiffs argue that they have a protectable property interest in the groundwater
that subirrigates their land pursuant to Riordan.
First, the Plaintiffs do not have a protectable property interest in the groundwater
pursuant to Riordan. The groundwater under each Plaintiffs' individual property is not secluded
to their property only, but traverses under the property of others. Therefore, the Riordan holding
does not apply.
Next, the Plaintiffs' takings claim fails for the same reason as their interference claim
does. First, if the Court were to accept the Plaintiffs' takings claim, it would allow the Plaintiffs
to control indirectly water which they could not control directly. Second, the Plaintiffs' irrigation
water was beneficial for irrigation at the historic levels only because of reliance on the
underground water. The Plaintiffs' irrigation water was sufficient to irrigate their land at historic
levels only because it was supplemented with the groundwater in which the Plaintiffs had no
r^ght to.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Defendant has taken the beneficial use of the
Plaintiffs' irrigation water. The Plaintiffs are free to use their irrigation water as they wish.
There is no evidence that the Plaintiffs' irrigation water is not the same quantity and quality now,
as it was before the Defendant started pumping the ground water.
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It is unfortunate for the Plaintiffs that their water right is insufficient to sustain the use of
their land in a way that they were accustomed to. But that was not caused by the Defendant
taking the Plaintiffs water rights. The Defendant merely used the water in which it lawfully had
appropriated. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have no protectable property interest in the
groundwater and there is not taking. The Defendant's Motion is granted as to this issue.
III. Negligence
Next, the Defendant argues that they owe no duty to maintain the ground water level at its
historic level, and no duty to stop pumping water. Consequently, the Defendant argues that the
Plaintiffs' negligence claim fails as a matter of law.
The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant does owe them a duty to refrain form using their
property in a way that injures their land. Alternatively, the Plaintiffs argue the Defendant has a
duty to maintain the watercourse so as to prevent damage to their property under Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-1-8.
The Defendant has no duty to refrain from using the water that they have rightfully
appropriated. Again, if the Court were to accept the Plaintiffs' negligence argument, it would
allow the Plaintiffs to control indirectly water which they had no right to control directly. In
effect, accepting the Plaintiffs' negligence argument would usurp the appropriation laws of this
State.
The Defendant's Motion is granted as to this issue. The Defendant does not owe the
Plaintiffs a duty to refrain from using water which the Defendant has rightfully appropriated and
which the Plaintiffs have no right to.
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IV. Statute of Limitations
The final issue is whether the Plaintiffs' three causes of action are barred because the
applicable statute of limitations has run.
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' causes of action are barred because the statute of
limitations has passed. The Defendant argues that the longest statute of limitation for any of the
three claims is the catchall, four year statute of limitation, found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307.
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs knew of the alleged damage caused by pumping the
water in the 1980fs and 1990!s. The Defendant argues that all three causes of action could have
been brought when the Plaintiffs first observed that their problems with irrigation were
associated with use of the Defendant's wells.
The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the four year statute of limitations applies. The
Plaintiffs also do not dispute that the they knew of the alleged damage caused by Defendant's
pumping of the water in the 1980fs and 1990's. Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs claim that the statute
of limitations has not expired because the continuous tort rule applies.
Under the continuous tort rule, a statute of limitations begins to run on the date each
wrong occurs or at the end of continuing wrongful conduct. 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation ofActions
§168.
The Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden in explaining how and why the
continuous tort rule applies to the three causes of action here. The Plaintiffs do not cite to, nor is
the Court aware of, any Utah precedent that applies the continuous tort rule to the three claims
the Plaintiffs assert here. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are arguing that new law should be applied. A
party seeking to change the law must do the heavy lifting associated with moving the law. The
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Plaintiffs merely cite to Utah cases where the continuous tort rule has been applied in other
contexts. None of those cases applied the continuous tort rule to causes of action for interference
with water rights, takings or negligence. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs do not explain how the
continuous tort rule applies to each of their separate claims. The Plaintiffs merely lump them
together, and fail to analyze whether the continuous tort rule applies, or why it should apply, to
these causes of action.
The Plaintiffs do cite to Utah law that states: in determining whether the continuous tort
rule should apply, courts are to look at the act that constitutes the wrongful conduct, not the harm
resulting from the act Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. KE. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d 1133, 1135
(Utah 2002). However, it is clear from the Brieggar holding that in classifying a trespass as
permanent or continuous, the courts look to the act, not the harm. Id. In other words, in
determining whether the continuous tort rule should apply in a trespass situation, Utah courts
look to the act, not the harm. The Plaintiffs' citation to this rule alone does not explain whether
this rule does or should apply to the three claims the Plaintiffs assert here. Utah courts have
clearly decided that the continuous tort rule can apply in trespass matters. What is not clear is
whether the continuous tort rule should apply to causes of action for takings, interference with
water rights and negligence. The Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden to show why the
continuous tort rule should apply to these causes of action.
Therefore, the continuous tort rule does not apply here. The Plaintiffs knew of their
causes of action at least as far back as the early 1980's or 1990's. The complaint was filed in
2004. Therefore, the four year catchall statute of limitations has passed and the Plaintiffs' causes
of action are barred.
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Dated this

/# day of

flfiV'

, 2008.

BY THE COURT:

JOHN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge
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SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

12

WHITE PINE COUNTY, NEVADA

13
14

SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH and UTAH
COUNTY, UTAH,

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

CASE NO. 0808100
DEPARTMENT NO. 2

Petitioners,
vs.
TRACY TAYLOR, P.E., Nevada State Engineer;
STATE OF NEVADA, DIVISION OF WATER
RESOURCES; DOES I through X; and ROE
CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive,

PETITIONERS' OPENING BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The undersigned affirms that this document does not
contain the personal information of any person.

Respondents, and
SOUTHERN NEVADA WATER AUTHORITY,
Intervening Party in Interest.

23
24

Petitioners SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH and UTAH COUNTY, UTAH (hereinafter

25

"Petitioners"), by and through their attorney of record, J. Mark Ward, Esq. and Aaron M. Waite,

26

Esq., submit the following opening brief in support of their petition for review of the Nevada

27

State Engineer's July 9,2008 "Interim Order No. 1" denying Petitioners' application for
28

interested person status in the matter of applications 54022 thorough 54030, inclusive, filed to

-l-

appropriate the underground waters of the Snake Valley hydrographic basin (195), White Pine
1
2

County, Nevada.
FACTS

3
4

1.

Petitioners are political subdivisions of the State of Utah.

2.

Respondent Mr. Tracy Taylor, P.E. is the Nevada State Engineer.

3.

Respondent State of Nevada, Division of Water Resources is a governmental

5
6
7
8
9

division of the State of Nevada.
4.

In or about 1989 the Las Vegas Valley Water District (hereinafter "LWWD")

10

filed applications with the Nevada State Engineer (hereinafter "the State Engineer") to
11
12

appropriate underground waters of the Snake Valley Hydrographic basin in White Pine County,

13

Nevada (applications 54022- 54030 inclusive (hereinafter the "Snake Valley applications").

14

Intervenor Southern Nevada Water Authority ("SNWA") is the successor in interest to the Snake

15

Valley applications. White Pine County is the county in which the matters affected or a portion
16
17
18
19

thereof are situated.
5.

The statutorily prescribed time period for filing a protest to a groundwater

application is 30 days after the date of last publication of the notice of application. Nevada

20

Revised Statutes ("NRS") 533.365(1).
21
22
23
24

6.

On or about May 28,2008, the State Engineer gave written notice of a preliminary

administrative hearing on the protested Snake Valley applications, scheduled for July 15,2008.
The State Engineer in the same notice established Monday, June 16,2008 at 5:00 pm as the

25

deadline to submit any request to be recognized as an interested person with respect to the Snake
26
27
28

Valley Applications.

7.

Petitioners on June 9,2008 and June 16, 2008 filed written requests with

1
2

respondents requesting recognition as interested persons with respect to the subject groundwater

3

applications. See Nevada Division of Water Resources Administrative Record on Appeal

4

("Record") at 1-5.)

5

8.

Respondent Taylor found that petitioners timely filed their requests for interested

6
7
8
9

person status. Interim Order No. 1 at page 2. (Record at 7)
9.

Petitioners requested interested person status in order to put on evidence at the

State Engineer's protest hearing on the Snake Valley applications, to show how granting the

10

Snake Valley Applications and allowing a 50,000 acre feet per year inter-basin groundwater
11
12

transfer could turn Snake Valley into another Owens Valley style dust bowl and seriously impact

13

the down-wind air quality of in the 1.5 million person population centers of Salt Lake and Utah

14

Valleys. (Record at 1-5)

15

10.

Petitioner Salt Lake County described to the State Engineer the reasons why it did

16
17
18
19
20

not file a timely protest to the Snake Valley Applications:
(1)
Salt Lake County is a political subdivision of the State of Utah and home
to Utah's capital Salt Lake City. Salt Lake County includes 764 square miles, is
35 miles long north to south and 35 miles wide east to west. Salt Lake County has(
approximately 910,000 residents, and many thousands more commute to the
County daily for work and other purposes.

21
22
23
24
25

(2)
Though bounded by the Oquirrh Mountains to the west, Salt Lake County
is situated in an air shed such that pollution and dust generated in Snake Valley is
carried into the valleys of the Wasatch Front including the Salt Lake Valley.
(3)
Salt Lake County includes part of the Great Salt Lake, which is the
terminus of the Great Salt Lake desert groundwater flow system toward the Great
Salt Lake Desert and Great Salt Lake itself.

26
27
28

(4)
The Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) is the successor in
interest to the Las Vegas Valley Water District (LWWD), the entity that filed
Application Nos. 54022-54030.

(5)
Approximately twenty years ago when LVVWD filed the subject
groundwater applications for Snake Valley, little was known about air quality
impacts from large scale groundwater pumping. Hence Salt Lake County, who
owned no water rights in Snake Valley, did not feel it was necessary to file
protests to the applications in the required time frame.

1
2
3
4

(6)
Since then, experiences in other parts of the country with dust bowls
caused by ground water pumping and the resulting air pollution, caused Salt Lake
County to become concerned about the potential air quality impacts of
groundwater pumping on the Snake Valley. If Application Nos. 54022-5430 are
granted and significant groundwater pumping occurs in Snake Valley, that would
likely cause the groundwater tables to drop significantly enough to destroy the
groundwater dependent vegetation in Snake Valley, thus creating a dust bowl.

5
6
7
8
9

(7)
Salt Lake County's concerns are amplified by the recent wildfire induced
dust bowls in Millard County, Utah (in valleys situated due eastward from Snake
Valley) which have produced wind-borne particulate matter pollution that has
been carried to Salt Lake Valley, raising public health concerns for the
approximately 1 million citizens who live and work there. Salt Lake County is
concerned that the groundwater pumping that will occur in Snake Valley will
produce a permanent dust bowl and provide a permanent source of wind-borne
particulate pollution to be carried to the population centers of the Wasatch Front
including Salt Lake Valley, causing chronic public health challenges for many
citizens who live and work there.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

(8)
Salt Lake County has become so concerned about the potential air
pollution impacts from SN WA's proposed Snake Valley pumping, that it has
formally requested cooperating agency status in the BLM NEPA Environmental
Impact Statement process on the SNWA groundwater project.

17
18
19

(9)
Salt Lake County requests interested party status, in order to advise the
hearing officer of the scientific basis for Salt Lake County's air quality concerns,
and urge the hearing officer to protect the citizens of Salt Lake County against
these potential impacts that will likely result if the subject groundwater
applications are granted.

20
21
22
23
24

(Record at 3-5)
11.

Petitioner Utah County described to the State Engineer the reasons why it did not

25

file a timely protest to the Snake Valley Applications:
26
27
28

(1)
Utah County is a political subdivision of the State of Utah, located 44
miles south of Salt Lake City. With over 500,000 people, Utah County is Utah's
second most populous county. The County seat is Provo. Utah County includes
2,143 square miles.

-4-

(2)
Utah County is believed to be situated in an air shed such that particulate
pollution and dust that may be generated in Snake Valley is carried into the
valleys of the Wasatch Front including Utah Valley.
(3)
The Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) is the successor in
interest to the Las Vegas Valley Water District (LVVWD), the entity that filed
Application Nos. 54022-54030.
(4)
Approximately twenty years ago when LWWD filed the subject
groundwater applications for Snake Valley, little was known about air quality
impacts from large scale groundwater pumping. Hence Utah County, who owned
no water rights in Snake Valley, did not believe it was necessary to file protests to
the Applications in the required time frame.
(5)
Since then, experiences in other parts of the country with dust bowls
caused by ground water pumping and the resulting air pollution, caused Utah
County to become concerned about the potential air quality impacts of
groundwater pumping on the Snake Valley. If the Applications are granted and
significant groundwater pumping occurs in Snake Valley that would likely cause
the ground water tables to drop significantly enough to destroy the ground water
dependent vegetation in Snake Valley, thus creating a dust bowl.
(6)
Utah County's concerns are amplified by the recent wildfire induced dust
bowls in Millard County, Utah (in valleys situated due eastward from Snake
Valley) which have produced wind-borne particulate matter pollution that has
been carried to Utah County, raising public health concerns for the approximate
half million citizens who live and work here. Utah County is concerned that the
groundwater pumping that will occur in Snake Valley will produce a permanent
dust bowl and provide a permanent source of wind-borne particulate pollution to
be carried to the population centers of the Wasatch Front including Utah Valley,
causing chronic public health challenges for many citizens who live and work
here.
(7)
Utah County has become so concerned about the potential air pollution
impacts from SNWA's proposed Snake Valley pumping, that it has formally
requested cooperating agency status in the BLM NEP A Environmental Impact
Statement process on the SNWA ground water project.
(9)
Utah County requests interested party status, in order to advise the hearing
officer of the scientific basis for Utah County's air quality concerns, and urge the
hearing officer to protect the citizens of Utah County against these potential
impacts that will likely result if the Applications are granted.
2)

-5-

12.

In SNWA's written opposition to Petitioners' requests for interested person status.

1
2

SNWA did not deny or question any of the Petitioners' contentions quoted above. To the

3

contrary SNWA expressly noted that

4

The Utah Counties explain that they did not file timely protests
because, in 1989 when the groundwater applications were filed,
there was no information available about air quality impact form
large scale groundwater pumping.

5
6
7

See SNWA's Opposition (filed with the State Engineer) to Applications for Interested Person
8
9
10
11

Status and Successor in Interest Status at page 6 (Petitioners' Supplemental Administrative
Record ("Supp. Record") at 6-7).
13.

Nor did SNWA deny for purposes of Nevada Administrative Code ("NAC")

12

533.100(2) that extreme circumstances prevented Petitioners from filing protests in a timely
13
14
15
16

manner. Id, at 6-7. (Supp. Record at 6-7)
14.

Therefore, when Petitioners filed with the State Engineer their written response to

SNWA's opposition, Petitioners had no reason to further address the question whether extreme

17

circumstances prevented them from filing protests in a timely manner. See Petitioners' Response
18
19

(filed with the State Engineer) to Opposition to Applications for Interested Party Status at pages

20

1-9. (Supp. Record at 20-28)

21

15.

Thus the issue framed by SNWA's opposition and Petitioners' response was not

22

whether extreme circumstances justified Petitioners' request for interested person status, but
23
24
25
26

whether the air quality evidence Petitioners sought to put on was relevant and admissible at the
upcoming Snake Valley protest hearing.
16.

The State Engineer's ruling denying Petitioners' interested person request

27

bypassed the admissibility/relevance issue framed by SNWA and the Petitioners. The State
28

Engineer opined merely that extreme circumstances did not justify Petitioners' failure to file a

timely protest. See State Engineer's July 9,2008 Interim Order No. 1 ("Interim Order No. 1")
1
2
3
4

(Record at 19)
17.

Air quality evidence never ran into a lack-of-relevance roadblock in the Spring

Valley portion of the State Engineer's proceedings on SNWA's groundwater applications. To

5

the contrary, evidence and information about air quality as it relates to the depletion of
6

7

groundwater and impact on groundwater dependent vegetation and soil stability, was sufficiently

8

significant to induce SNWA and the federal protestants in the Spring Valley hearings to negotiate]

9

for promises to protect against such air quality impacts and to submit that contract to the State

10

Engineer for review and approval in the Spring Valley groundwater proceedings. See September
11
12

8,2006 Stipulation and Withdrawal of Protests entered into by SNWA and various Federal

13

Agency protestants in the Spring Valley portion of the State Engineer's proceedings on SNWA's

14

groundwater applications, which Stipulation is listed as an exhibit in the State Engineer's list of

15

hearing exhibits in the Spring Valley hearing (hereafter "Spring Valley Stipulated Agreement")
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

(Supp. Record at 29-75).
18.

The Spring Valley Stipulated Agreement states in relevant part:

The common goals of the Parties are 1) to manage the development
of groundwater by SNWA in the Spring Valley HB in order to
avoid unreasonable adverse effects to wetlands, wet meadow
complexes, springs, streams, and riparian andphreatophytic
[ground water dependent] communities (hereafter referred to
as Water-dependent Ecosystems) and maintain the biological
diversity and ecological health of the Area of Interest1 over the
long term,
"
Id. at 4 (emphasis added). (Supp. Record at 32)

25
26
27

The common goals of the Parties is to manage the development of
groundwater by SNWA in the Spring Valley HB to avoid an
unreasonable degradation of the scenic values of, and visibility

28

The "Area of Interest" agreed to by SNWA and the Federal Agencies is a vast that stretches well
into Utah. See Figure 1 to Stipulated Agreement (Supp. Record at 48).

from Great Basin National Park due to a potential increase in
airborne particulates and loss of surface vegetation which may
result from groundwater withdrawals by SNWA in the Spring
Valley HB.

1
2
3
4

|d. at 5 (emphasis added). (Supp. Record at 33)

5

Further, it is in the Parties' best interests to cooperate in the
collection and analysis of additional information regarding the
relationship between the development of groundwater resources,
loss of surface vegetation, drying of surface soils, increased
susceptibility of land surfaces to wind erosion, and the long-term
avoidance of unreasonable degradation of the scenic values of,
and visibility from, Great Basin National Park.

6
7
8
9
10

Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added). (Supp. Record at 33-34)

11

The DOI Bureaus hereby expressly agree to withdraw their protests
to the SNWA Applications and agree that the Nevada State
Engineer may rule on the SNWA Applications based upon the terms
and conditions set forth herein.

12
13
14
15

Id. at 6. (Supp. Record at 34)
The Parties agree that a copy of this Stipulation shall be submitted
to the Nevada State Engineer at the commencement of the
administrative proceedings scheduled to begin on September 11,
2006. At that time, the Parties shall request on the record at the
beginning of the scheduled proceeding that the State Engineer
include this Stipulation and Exhibits A and B as part of the permit
terms and conditions in the event that he grants any of the SNWA
Applications in total or in part.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 9. (Supp. Record at 37)
19.

The Court in denying respondents' and SNWA's motions to dismiss, has declared

that it has jurisdiction over the present matter pursuant to NRS 533.450.

25

20.

If allowed interested person status at the Snake Valley hearing, Petitioners would

26
27
28

look to and rely upon the expert opinion of hydrogeologist Timothy Durbin, a recognized expert
on the predicted effects of groundwater pumping in Snake Valley and other nearby valleys.
Petitioners believe and proffer it is Mr. Durbin's opinion that Owens Valley California is the
-8-

model of what to expect in Snake Valley should the groundwater pumping proposed by SNWA
1
2

occur there. In other words, the pumping proposed by SNWA will lower the water table so

3

much, that it will kill off groundwater dependent vegetation, thus causing an Owens Valley style

4

dust bowl. To further explain this proffer of Mr. Durbin's testimony and not intending it as

5
6

evidence, Petitioners attach as Exhibit A hereto a copy of a Las Vegas Sun June 29, 2008 article

7

reporting on Mr. Durbin reputed assessment of the SNWA groundwater project and its

8

propensity to recreate another Owens Valley style dust bowl.

9

21.

Petitioners, if allowed interested person status, will also request the Utah Division

10

of Environmental Quality and related air quality offices to assess and prepare a report on the
11
12

potential for increased particulate matter pollution in Salt Lake and Utah Counties caused by the

13

SNWA caused dust storm in Snake Valley that Mr. Durbin is reputed to anticipate.

14

Petitioners

will submit this report as part of its overall presentation as interested persons in the Snake Valley

15
16
17
18
19
20

hearing.

RELEVANT STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
NRS 533.365 (1) states in relevant part:
Any person interested may, within 30 days after the date of last publication of
the notice of application, file with the State Engineer a written protest against the
granting of the application... .

21
22

(Emphasis added)

23

NRS 533.370(5) states in relevant part:

24
25
26
27

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1), where there is no unappropriated
water in the proposed source of supply, or where its proposed use or change
conflicts with existing rights or with protectible interests in existing domestic wells
as set forth in NRS 533.024, or threatens to prove detrimental to the public
interest the State Engineer shall reject the application and refuse to issue the
requested permit.

28

(Emphasis added)

1

NRS 533.370(6) states:

2
3
4

In determining whether and application for an interbasin transfer of groundwater
must be rejected pursuant to this section, the State Engineer shall consider:
(a)

Whether the applicant has justified the need to import the water from
another basin;

(b)

If the State Engineer determines that a plan for conservation of water is
advisable for the basin into which the water is to be imported, whether the
applicant has demonstrated that such a plan has been adopted and is being
effectively carried out

(c)

Whether the proposed aetion is environmentally sound as it relates to
the basin from which the water is exported;

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12

(d)
Whether the proposed action is an appropriate long-term use which
will not unduly limit the future growth and development in the basin
from which the water is exported; and

13
14

(e)

Any other factor the State Engineer determines to be relevant.

15

(Emphasis added)

16

NRS 533.450 states in relevant part:

17

(1)
18
19
20
21
22

Any person feeling himself aggrieved by any order or decision of the
State Engineer, acting in person or through his assistants or the water
commissioner, affecting his interests, when the order or decision relates to
the administration of determined rights or is made pursuant to NRS
533.270 to 533.445 inclusive, or NRS 533.481, 534.193, 535.200, or
536.200, may have the same reviewed by a proceeding for that purpose,
insofar as it may be in the nature of an appeal, which must be initiated in
the proper court of the county in which the matters affected or a portion
thereof are situated . . . .

23
24
25
26
27

28

(Emphasis added)
NAC 533.100 states:
(1)

A person who wishes to be recognized by the state engineer as an interested
person must file a written request for recognition with the office of the state
engineer and pay a fee in the amount prescribed by NRS 533.435 for filing a
protest, at least 30 days before the hearing or prehearing conference at which he
wishes to be recognized.
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1

(2)

The state engineer will grant the request for recognition upon a showing that
extreme circumstances prevented the person from filing his own protest in a
timely manner.

(3)

An interested person may only testify on matters of law, broad public issues or
matters concerning how any action of the state engineer with regard to a particular
application may affect the operation of a specific water transportation and supply
project.

2
3
4
5
6
7

(Emphasis added)

8

ARGUMENT

9

Factual History and Basis for Reversal

10
11

The standard for becoming an interested person in a proceeding before the State Engineer

12

is a two part standard. First, the applicant must show "that extreme circumstances prevented the
13
14

person from filing his own protest in a timely manner." NRS 533.100(2). Second, the interested

15

person may "testify only on matters of law, broad public policy issues or matters concerning how

16

any action of the State Engineer with regard to a particular application may affect the operation

17

of a specific water transportation and supply project." (Emphasis added).
18
19
20
21

A.

Extreme Circumstances - No Actual Notice
SNWA's opposition to the Petitioners' application completely ignored the "extreme

circumstances" provision, claiming only that the Petitioners' concerns about air quality impacts

22

were irrelevant to the proceeding before the State Engineer. By contrast, the State Engineer's
23
24

Order focused only on the extreme circumstances provision and ignored the relevance of the

25

public policy issues involving the applications associated with environmental impacts, including

26

air quality.

27

The applications were filed in 1989. Nineteen years later in 2008, the Petitioners cannot
28

unequivocally state that it did or did not receive notice in 1989 or otherwise learn of the Snake

-li-

Valley Applications, nor can the State Engineer unequivocally state that Petitioners did receive
1
2

such notice or otherwise learn of the Snake Valley Applications. It is extremely unlikely that

3

actual notice was either sent by the State Engineer or otherwise received by either Salt Lake

4

County or Utah County, however, because NRS 533.095 and 533.110 only require the State

5

Engineer to give notice to persons claiming rights in or to the waters involved in any particular
6
7

adjudication proceeding. If the State Engineer maintains that notice was in fact given to the

8

Petitioners, then notice would have been given for a reason other than a claim to water rights in

9

the basin and would acknowledge the Petitioners' status as an interested party.

10

An "interested person" is defined as "a person who fails to file a protest in a timely
11
12

manner but who is recognized by the State Engineer, pursuant to NAC 533.100, as a person

13

entitled to testify at the hearing." (Emphasis Added) NRS 533.040. By implication, an

14

interested person may not claim a right to water, but may demonstrate an interest in public issues

15

or matters concerning a particular application. An interested party may not, therefore, receive
16
17
18
19

actual notice as a claimant of water rights.
The "extreme circumstances" preventing the Petitioners from filing a timely protest in
this matter are two fold: The first extreme circumstance was the lack of actual notice. The

20

second extreme circumstance was alluded to in Petitioners' letters requesting interested person
21
22

status, when they stated that even if the Petitioners were aware of the petitions, the potential

23

impacts of groundwater pumping on soil stability and particulate matter on air quality were not

24

well understood at the time and the public interest issues were not apparent. It should be noted

25
26

that NAC 533.010.1(b) acknowledges that the adjudication provisions "must be liberally

27

construed to secure the just, speedy and economical determination of all issues presented to the

28

state engineer." (Emphasis added).
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At the time of the preliminary hearing on July 15, 2008 the hearing officer announced that
1
2

the evidentiary hearing on the applications will not occur until "sometime in the fall of 2009."

3

NRS 533.130.1 provides that "any person interested in the water of any stream upon whom no

4

notice shall have been had of the pendency of proceedings for the determination of the relative

5

rights to the use of water of such stream system, and who shall have no actual knowledge or
6
7

notice of the pendency of the proceedings, may, at any time prior to the expiration of six months

8

after the entry of the determinations of the State Engineer, file a petition to intervene in the

9

proceedings." Although apparently intended to apply to claimants, this provision is further

10
11

evidence of the ability to deviate from a strict application of the time provisions. Allowing the

12

Petitioners to participate as an interested party will not disadvantage the other parties or delay the

13

adjudication proceeding.

14

B.

Public Policy - Air Quality

15
16

The very nature of an inter-basin transfer of groundwater involves broad public issues.

17

An interested person may testify on broad public issues with regard to a particular water

18

transportation or supply project. See, NAC 533.100(3).

19

In considering an application for an interbasin transfer of groundwater, the State Engineer
20
21

shall consider whether the proposed action is "environmentally sound as it relates to the basin

22

from which the water is exported" (Emphasis Added) NRS 533.370 (6)(c). The State Engineer

23

also has the authority to require an environmental or other study prior to a final determination on

24

an application. See, NRS 555.368.
25
26

Petitioners are concerned that the diversion of groundwater from Snake Valley will lower

27

the water table and eradicate phreatophytic vegetation resulting in soil instability in the basin

28

from which the water is exported. Soil instability may create dust conditions in the basin of such

-13-

a magnitude, that it will aggravate the already challenged particulate air quality conditions in the
1
2

in the nearby valleys occupied by the Petitioners. The public policy at issue is, therefore,

3

whether the project is environmentally sound with regard to its' potential impact on conditions in

4

the basin from which the water is exported.

5

The State Engineer previously considered the issue of what constitutes "environmentally
6
7

sound" in the Spring Valley determination (Ruling 5726) as follows:
While there are no definitions [in the statutes] of what environmentally sound is,
there are examples of what environmentally sound is not, such as the Owens
Valley project in California. The State Engineer believes that the legislative intent
of NRS Section 533.370(6)(c) was to protect the natural resources of the basin of
origin and prevent a repeat of the Owens Valley while at the same time allowing
for responsible use of the available water resources by the citizens of Nevada.

8
9
10
11
12

22.

In the Spring Valley proceedings, air quality was determined to be a substantial

13
14

public policy matter. SNWA negotiated an agreement with various federal agencies to monitor

15

and mitigate against regional air quality impacts caused by the proposed action's depletion of

16

groundwater dependent vegetation. That agreement was incorporated in the State Engineer's

17

ruling on the Spring Valley matter.
18

23. Thus the Petitioners seek interested party status to advise the State Engineer of the

19
20

scientific basis for the Petitioners' concerns of the potential impacts of the applications on the

21

natural resources in the basin of origin. Air quality has previously been determined to be a

22

substantial public policy matter. Allowing the Petitioners to participate as an interested party
23
24
25

will not disadvantage the other parties or delay the adjudication proceeding scheduled for the fall
of2009

26

WHEREFORE, Petitioners pray that they be awarded the following relief:

27

A.

For reversal of the State Engineer's denial of Petitioners' request for interested

28

person status with respect to SNWA's Snake Valley Applications Nos 54011-54030 inclusive;
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1

B.

For an order requiring the State Engineer to allow Petitioners to participate as

2

interested persons in the protest hearing on SNWA's Snake Valley Applications Nos 54011-

3

54030 inclusive; and

4

C.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

5
6

us •?
Dated this
£_

cday of January, 2009.

7
8
9
10
11

J. Ma/k^ard, U t a h Bar No. 4436
UtahVCssociation of Counties
5397 South Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84017
801-265-1331 Telephone
801-265-9485 Fax

12
13
14
15

Aaron M. Waite, Esq., Nevada Bar No. 7947
In Association with Hirschi Christensen, PLLC
21E.MesquiteBlvd.
PO Box 3778
Mesauite, Nevada 89024
702-346-0820 Telephone
801-322-0594 Fax

16
17

Attorneys for Petitioners Salt Lake County, Utah and Utah County, Utah

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that on this date, I caused to be served a true and correct
3

copy of the foregoing document on the following by U.S. Postal Service, postage prepaid:

4

Tracy Taylor, State Engineer of Nevada
Division of Water Resources
901 South Stewart Street, Suite 2002
Carson City, Nevada 89701

5
6
7

Bryan Stockton
Deputy Attorney General
Nevada Attorney General's Office
100 North Carson Street
Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717

8
9
10
11

Paul G. Taggart, Esq.
TAGGART & TAGGART, LTD.
108 North Minnesota Street
Carson City, Nevada 89703

12
13
14
15

^
16

Dated this ^

day of January, 2009.

17
18

ts

19

2o
21
22

11

Utah Association of Counties
53 97 South Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84017
801-265-1331 Telephone
801-265-9485 Fax

23
24
25
26
27
28
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1

AFFIRMATION (Pursuant to NRS 2398,030)

2

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the foregoing PETITION FOR
3
4

JUDICIAL REVIEW does not contain the Social Security Number or Taxpayer Identification

5

Number of any person.

6

Dated this J|

day of January, 2009.

1

8
9
10
11
12

J. MaVk VMTTtah Bar No. 4436
Utah Association of Counties
5397 South Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84017
801-265-1331 Telephone
801-265-9485 Fax

13
14
15
16

Aaron M. Waite, Esq., Nevada Bar No. 7947
In Association with Hirschi Christensen, PLLC
21 E. Mesquite Blvd.
PO Box 3778
Mesquite, Nevada 89024
702-346-0820 Teleohone
801-322-0594 Fax

17

Attorneys for Petitioners Salt Lake County, Utah and Utah County, Utah
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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Exhibit A

'Owens Valley is the model of what toi iecf - Las Vegas Sun

Page 1 of 19

LAS VEGAS SUN
Quenching Las Vegas' thirst: Part 5:

'Owens Valley is the model of
what to expect'
As Las Vegas policymakers eye the water beneath Nevada, a
scientific debate erupts over the possible effects

Sam Morris
Hydrogeologist Timothy Durbin was recruited by the Southern Nevada Water Authority in 2001 to help predict the
effects of ground water pumping in the Great Basin Desert. The former U.S. Geological Survey employee found
pumping could result in a significant drop in the area's water table.
By Emily Green, Las Vegas Sun
Sun, Jun 29, 2008 (2 a.m.)

The raw glory of the Mojave and Great Basin deserts is difficult to imaginefromthe paved fantasy land of Las Vegas.
As the road wends north of the city, past sun-soaked bluffs into Pahranagat Valley, there is what looks like a river but
are in fact four spring-fed lakes running for some 40 miles.
Audubon himself would weep at the birdlife working this watering spot on the Pacific fly way. Bald eagles ride the
breezes. Herons skid across the water.
http://www.lasveeassun.com/news/2008/iun/29/owens-vallev-mode1-what--exnect/

1 /S/90DQ

'Owens Valley is the model of what ta

:>ect' - Las Vegas Sun
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Proceed across huge desert valleys and the landrises.Yucca gives way to pine, the hot desert to cold, Paiute territory to
Shoshone.
This is the land of nut gatherers.
Three hours into the drive north from the Las Vegas offices of the Southern Nevada Water Authority, there is no
missing the entry to Spring Valley. Farms begin to dot the valley floor, alfalfa fields meld with bright green carpets of
greasewood and rabbitbrush.
By the time Wheeler Peak appears, the conifers rival those of the Sierra. In Spring Valley, one type of cedar is thought
unique on Earth. There are bats, owls, woodpeckers, rabbits, elk, mountain lions.
Yet throughout the Great Basin Desert, the fecundity persists on the slimmest of margins.
It survives because, after spring thaw, not all of the mountain snowmelt is immediately absorbed by the desert.
Rather, springs, creeks and ponds form, all held above ground by pressure from more water below.
This water below is the Great Basin aquifer, a vast pool dating back to the ice age.
There could be no more enticing prospect for a desert city like Las Vegas than these millions of sleeping gallons.
But if the aquifer is pumped too hard, the system of springs, streams and lakes supporting life above ground could
disappear.
At issue, then, was could, and should Las Vegas attempt to get this water.
In considering a pipeline to tap the aquifer, Las Vegas calculated how much water flowed into the valleys of the Great
Basin each year, then how much went legally unclaimed.
In 1989, Las Vegasfiledapplications with the state engineer for what was thought to be the rights to half the available
water in Nevada — more than 800,000 acre-feet from some 30 valleys.
When, more than a decade later, the Southern Nevada Water Authority considered how to turn the massive block of
claims into real water, the plan was pared down to six key valleys in Clark, Lincoln and White Pine counties, spanning
the terrain north of Las Vegas, from hot desert to cold.
This time Las Vegas sought roughly 200,000 acre-feet a year of water, enough to serve a million people.
The pipeline length shrank from more than 1,000 miles to 285 miles.
It could always sprout arteries later.
As a next step, the state engineer would need to hold hearings in which Las Vegas would make its case for the water
and protesters would appear with their objections.
The state engineer's decisions would not come in a single finding. Rather, since 2002, he has been scrutinizing
applications valley by valley, or several valleys at a time. Each green light he gives adds water to the pipeline.
One hearing over one valley had make-or-break status for the pipeline plan.
Of the 200,000 acre-feet of water a year sought by Las Vegas, roughly 90,000 acre-feet would ideally come from
Spring Valley, one of the basins receiving spring snowmeltfromthe snow-studded queen of Nevada ranges, Wheeler
Peak.
Las Vegas was seeking what it estimated to be all legally unclaimed water in Spring Valley.
The Spring Valley hearing began on Sept. 11, 2006. The two weeks of testimony that followed were most remarkable
for what wasn't said.
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/jun/29/owens-valley-model-what-expect/
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Making the case in 2006 that hot desert Nevada needed the cold desert's water was not hard. Seventy percent of
Nevadans lived in or around Las Vegas.
What was difficult was demonstrating the cold desert had water to spare.
Arguing that it didn't would be the Princeton-educated eminence grise of American ground water, John Bredehoeft,
whose title at the U.S. Geological Survey in the 1970s and '80s was no less than Regional Hydrologist Responsible for
Water Activities in the Eight Western States.
Bredehoeft had been aware of Las Vegas pipeline plan from its inception.
He never liked it.
Bredehoeft was going to appear at the Spring Valley hearing as an expert witness for rural communities protesting the
Las Vegas pipeline.
As he explains it, there is no water to spare for Las Vegas without disrupting the equilibrium between water flowing in
from snowmelt and water taken out every year by ranchers, plants and animals.
Las Vegas managed to insert itself into this equation because under Nevada water law, only some of the Great Basin's
traditional water users are legally entitled to it.
Towns are, farms are, mines are, but under increasingly antiquated definitions developed in the first half of the last
century to do with "beneficial use," most of the native flora isn't.
Following this logic, water used by plants such as the cold desert's signature shrub, greasewood, may be legally
diverted hundreds of miles away to Las Vegas.
But by the time Las Vegas was going for greasewood's share of Spring Valley's water in 2006, the law of "beneficial
use" was at loggerheads with a host of other modern laws protecting the environment
Greasewood belongs to a class of plants called "phreatophytes," named because their long roots are capable of reaching
deep underground to access the water table.
As Bredehoeft sees it, if Las Vegas sinks its wells and the roots of the phreatophytes continue to chase the descending
water table, that means Las Vegas won't be taking the waterfromthe greasewood but from storage in the aquifer.
"Taking water out of storage," he says, "is mining."
Mining ground water is illegal in Nevada.
Mine enough of it and the water table can drop for hundreds of miles around. Springs stopflowing,streams disappear,
plants and animals dependent on them die.
So the logic goes: Target the phreatophytes whose water you intend to take, and don't allow them to compete for water.
Pump hard. Kill them fast. Then let the system return to equilibrium so what water comes in from snowmelt equals
what is taken out by Las Vegas pumps, and the water table doesn't fall inexorably.
But this weeds-for-water logic becomes a problem when greasewood serves an important function above and beyond
offering forage to deer and cattle.
Phreatophytes prevent dust storms.
Spring Valley sits at the foot of Mt. Wheeler. In 1986, then-Congressman Harry Reid led Wheeler's transformation into
Great Basin National Park, in no small part because of Spring Valley's pristine air.
httn://www.lasveeassim.com/news/2008/iun/29/owens-vallev-niodeLwhat-expect/
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Without a high water table saturating the valley floor and the long roots of phreatophytes anchoring the soil, Spring
Valley could become the kind of dust bowl created by Los Angeles after William Mulholland began pumping Owens
Lake in 1913.
Once Los Angeles drained the lake in California's high Sierra, it began taking Owens Valley ground water. By the
1980s, the wasteland created by Los Angeles had given dust a new common name.
The vile mix of fine sand, arsenic and assorted metals billowing out of Owens Valley became the single worst source of
"particulate pollution" in the nation, registering at 23 times the level allowed by federal heath standards. Itfilledlocal
emergency rooms with asthmatic children. It traveled hundreds of miles, clouding three national parks and repeatedly
shutting down China Lake Naval Weapons Center.
Owens Valley was not the image the keepers of Nevada's only national park wanted on their postcards.
Las Vegas found itself putting on two faces.
It was applying to the state engineer of Nevada to seize the greasewood's share of Spring Valley's water.
But in 2004, in seeking passage for the pipeline across federal land, Mulroy had gone before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and promised, "An Owens Valley cannot and will not occur in Nevada."
•••

In the 1980s, when ground around wells in the Las Vegas Valley had collapsed in feet, not inches,frompumping,
geologist Terry Katzer got an idea.
He was in the Nevada office of the Geological Survey, one of the many western research outposts then overseen by
John Bredehoeft.
He asked Bredehoeft: Could Great Basin ground water be moved south to Las Vegas?
Not without mining, Bredehoeft responded.
Katzer declined to speak for this series, but Bredehoeft remembers their relationship at the Geological Survey as
strained.
As relations soured, Katzer quit and took the idea for pumping the Great Basin to a more receptive audience: the Las
Vegas Valley Water District.
In 1985, Katzer became the district's director of research and in 1986, he hired Kay Brothers, a hydrologist with a
bachelor's degree in engineering from the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology.
Brothers' background was helping the petroleum industry comply with environmental regulations. As Katzer's pipeline
plan was set in motion in 1999, this was the skill most needed by Mulroy and her newly formed Southern Nevada
Water Authority.
Brothers became Mulroy's director of resources and by 2002, she was named deputy general manager. Second to
Mulroy, Brothers became the face of the pipeline project.
Katzer began working for Brothers, his former assistant.
But in the new administrative setup, if the politics lay with Mulroy and Brothers, the science remained with Katzer and
his old network of colleagues out of the Nevada office of the U.S. Geological Survey.
If the Great Basin aquifer were to become a major new water supply for Las Vegas, Brothers and Katzer would need
someone capable of modeling the effects of pumping.
Katzer turned to his former boss at the Geological Survey's Nevada office, hydrogeologist Timothy Durbin. Katzer had
http://www.lasvegassunxom/news/2008/jun/29/owens-valley-model-what-expect/
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been Durbin's principal assistant. Durbin, in turn, reported to Bredehoefl,
Between the time the pipeline idea first horrified Bredehoefl in the 1980s and the moment that his former No. 2 man in
Nevada began recruiting his former No. 1 to work on it in 2001, Bredehoefl had left the federal agency and opened a
private hydrology practice.
So had Durbin, who had done some consulting jobs for Katzer and Las Vegas.
Durbin was intrigued by the Katzer plan: Here was a chance to come into a massive new project and design it in a way
that you could manage the effects.
If, Durbin wondered, that were possible. And it was a mother of an if.
As Durbin joined Katzer and both men looked over the Las Vegas pipeline plan, Durbin saw exactly what Bredehoefl
had tried to warn Katzer about those years earlier.
The plan was fraught with risks.
The Great Basin comprises many valleys. Underlying them, the prehistoric jumble of rock and sand is often so
permeable that ground water can flow hundreds of miles from valley to valley.
This meant the effects of pumping one valley could conceivably be felt hundreds of miles away.
They would clearly have to avoid pulling water from the sources feeding the four lakes of the Pahranagat Valley, the
Muddy River and other places protected by the U.S. Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife and Nevada environmental
programs.
The best target for Las Vegas was the lush and lovely Spring Valley, 100 miles long and roughly 12 miles wide. It not
only received the bonanza snowmelt of Wheeler Peak, but the aquifer's flow also seemed relatively contained there.
But they knew there would be sacrifices:
• Depleting spring flows.
• Denuding hundreds of thousands of acres of federally owned grazing and recreational land of its native flora and
fauna.
• Supplanting phreatophytes with the nonnative and invasive cheat grass, which by late spring is so dry it is akin to
setting tinder at the feet of Nevada'sfire-pronealpine ranges.
• Sullying air around Great Basin National Park.
• Unseating ranchers who were direct descendants of Nevada's earliest pioneers.
According to Durbin, after years of arguing with Bredehoefl, Katzer too began to see his point.
"There is nofreewater."
But to Durbin's mind, "Las Vegas was not going to go away."
He knew he could not create public policy. But he could help inform it.
As a scientist, he would lay out the options and the effects, and then the public could decide whether it was willing to
make the sacrifices necessary for Las Vegas to tap Great Basin water.
"It's a societal issue," he says. "It's a value judgment. What's valuable and what's not?"
The sacrifices implicit in the plan for rural Nevada were so great, particularly for its watery heart of White Pine
County, that Durbin half expected Las Vegas to hold them up as proof that Southern Nevada couldn't possibly tap this
source and Las Vegas instead deserved more Colorado River water.
htto://wwvv.lasvefiassun.com/news/2008/iun/29/owens-vallev-model-what-exDect/
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Except by the close of 2003, the pipeline's inevitable effects weren't being used to argue for an alternate source of
water.
Instead, as Durbin saw it, in pushing the project forward for an ever-thirstier Las Vegas, the Southern Nevada Water
Authority began hiding possible outcomes.
According to Durbin, pressure to downplay and even deny the project's effects started to come in 2003 in meetings
with Paul Taggart, the attorney representing Las Vegas' claims before the state engineer.
Thefirstglimpse of it involved relatively minor hearings concerning a spangle of wells that Las Vegas wanted to sink
in Clark and southern Lincoln counties.
According to Durbin, Taggart wanted him and Katzer to testify "no impacts."
"Neither of us felt we could do that," Durbin says.
They sent Taggart a memo laying out a strategy, emphasizing the need to kill off phreatophytes for the Las Vegas
pipeline plan.
First, Las Vegas could take the pipeline to relatively uninhabited "dry" valleys of Lincoln County.
This would be stopgap. There weren't enough greasewood-type plants here whose water they could legally intercept.
They would be mining.
But if they used shallow pumps, Durbin calculated, they could spread out effects in space and time in such a way as to
be able to stop pumping short of the point that Las Vegas dried up the White and Muddy rivers and the precious lakes
ofPahranagat.
This would buy time to get to the more verdant "wet valleys" of the northern cold desert, where mining wouldn't be
such a worry.
There were plenty of phreatophytes in Spring Valley to partfromtheir water.
Once Las Vegas got into Spring Valley, Katzer and Durbin recommended buying water rights from ranchers willing to
sell. This would preempt protests.
Then, they recommended, Las Vegas should pump hard to quickly kill off greasewood communities. With Spring
Valley on line, they could then ease up in "dry" Lincoln County in time to spare Pahranagat Valley and the White and
Muddy rivers.
Their plan — effects and all — on record within the water authority, Durbin and Katzer worked on the model and
pumping strategy throughout 2004 and 2005.
But in the background, news that rural ranchers were mounting a rousing defense for Spring Valley's water played
incessantly in the Las Vegas press.
To quell the uproar, Mulroy and Brothers began arguing to reporters and in public meetings in White Pine County that
they could pump Spring Valley — and save the greasewood, save the rabbitbrush, save the meadows, even save the
alfalfa and cattle ranches.
In other words, they were pledging to save the very things Katzer and Durbin worked so hard figuring out how and
where and when to sacrifice.
As the Spring Valley hearing approached in September 2006, after five years' work, Durbin's model was finally ready
to simulate pumping for the full 90,000 acre-feet of water being sought by Las Vegas. The result? The level of the
water table underlying Spring Valley would drop on the order of 200 feet or more over 75 years.
httD://www.lasveeassun.com/news/2008/iun/29/owens-vallev-model-what-exDect/
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This would, as Durbin and Katzer had envisioned, indeed kill offspring Valley's phreatophytes.
It would also end traditional ranching in the valley.
And with no water saturating the top soil and no roots to anchor it, the parched earth of Spring Valley could indeed
become a new Owens Valley.
•••

In 1989, the Department of Interior agencies that manage most of the land in Nevada — the Bureau of Land
Management, the U.S. Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Bureau of Indian Affairs — had been among
the most forceful opponents of the original Las Vegas applications.
As the Spring Valley hearing approached in September 2006, Mulroy and Brothers still faced their opposition.
During a prehearing evidence exchange between Las Vegas1 attorneys and the opponents, the U.S. Park Service
received Durbin's model and ran it.
The Park Service hydrologist came up with the same result as Durbin.
This could have been a brutal embarrassment for Mulroy and Brothers, except on the last working day before the
Spring Valley hearing began, all four Interior agencies, including the Park Service, withdrew their protests.
Swallowing hard, the Interior agencies instead agreed to take places on committees to monitor the effects of pumping.
Representatives of almost every agency to sign the agreement explained the logic this way: By settling, they were
assured some measure of control and could work with Las Vegas toward its much-vaunted goal of little or no damage.
But if they protested and lost, they had nothing.
Durbin, the man trained as a scientific adviser to these very Interior agencies, didn't think monitoring would work.
"I'm going to guess that even with the monitoring, there will be long-running disputes with one side saying, 'OK,
something happened in the mountains. Was it caused by pumping by the Southern Nevada Water Authority, or did a
cow drink all the water, or was it low precipitation?' " he says.
The agreement between federal agencies and the water authority meant the Park Service's running of Durbin's
pumping model (and the result being the same finding of a drop of 200 feet or more in the water table), could not be
used in the hearing before the state engineer, either.
So, as the Spring Valley hearing commenced, the man with the most damning case against the Las Vegas pumping plan
was Timothy Durbin, the Southern Nevada Water Authority's own expert witness.
• ••

Almost three years after the meetings that prompted their pumping plan memo of 2003, Katzer and Durbin were back
consulting with water authority attorney Paul Taggart over how to mount Las Vegas' case for the ail-important Spring
Valley hearing.
Taggart would not comment for this story.
However, according to Durbin, he and Terry Katzer again came under pressurefroma water authority engineer and
Taggart to soft-pedal the project's effects.
"At that point, Terry was agreeing with me: That's nonsense," Durbin says.
Shortly after preparation for the hearing began with Taggart, Durbin got a call from Katzer.
He had just quit.
httr>7/www la<;vecra<?<*un cnm/ne\v5?/?008/iim/?9/nw(an<?-v«11pv-moflftl-\vhat-p.Ynpct/
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Katzer was the one who brought the idea of the Las Vegas pipeline to the water authority in the first place, and then
hired Durbin.
But Durbin said he could not follow Katzer's move in quitting.
In five years as a consultant to the Southern Nevada Water Authority, Durbin had accepted what he reckons was
roughly $1 million in consulting fees.
The point of retaining him had been to generate a model for the state engineer. He could not betray his client and walk
out just before the first key hearing.
That said, relations between him and his client could not have been worse.
Still, Taggart had little option but to put a now-hostile Durbin on the stand.
In a series of smaller hearings leading up to the Spring Valley one in September 2006, the state engineer had demanded
modeling.
As Durbin took the stand before the state engineer on Sept. 14, 2006, he had decided that if anyone asked flat out
whether he had run his model and what the results were, he would give the answer.
If not, he wouldn't.
Durbin was not questioned by Taggart, a man guaranteed to make him bristle, but by another attorney for Las Vegas,
Michael Van Zandt,
In more than an hour of detailed testimony, Van Zandt led Durbin on a journey through the minutiae of how models are
created.
"Identifying data gaps ... version two of that model ...just an evolutionfromversion one ... simulation of faults ...
efficient equation solvers ... meshes for individual compartments ..."
"It was stultifying," says Matt Kenna, a lawyerfromthe Western Environmental Law Center representing the
protesters. "The incredible irrelevant detail."
Finally, Van Zandt led Durbin home to the single point Las Vegas wanted to land about modeling: The uncertainty of
any result that might embarrass it.
Questioned about margins of error, Durbin responded with yet more mind-numbing detail: "The plus standard error of
the estimated water level measurements ... are plus or minus 50 feet... 30 percent chance that the estimated ground
water levels are more than 50 feet off what the true level would be ..."
When at last the state engineer himself asked Durbin how the model could be used to predict the future of the Spring
Valley aquifer if pumping began, Durbin brightened and quickly reeled off some simple steps. Van Zandt — seeing
where this was going — quickly interjected to the state engineer, "There will be other witnesses who will probably
answer that question for you."
In cross examination, Kenna had no idea of the hostility between Las Vegas' attorneys and their star witness, or how
accommodating Durbin might have been if asked flat out: "Did he run his model and, if so, what was the result?"
Instead, he fished around the margins and hooked more technical gobbledygook.
Why? According to Kenna, "The standard lawyer's advice is 'don't ask the ultimate question.'" The witness might not
answer it.
A week later, the protesting parties brought in the lion.
Bredehoeft took the stand for them.
httn://wwwJasvega5JSiin.com/new5;/?.OflX/iiin/?Q/nwpn<!-vallpv-rnoHeLwliat-PYnprt/
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The former Regional Hydrologist Responsible for Water Activities in the Eight Western States was there to defend
modeling.
Whether it be to calculate potential effects of nuclear waste leaking from Yucca Mountain or predict effects of Las
Vegas' pumping of Great Basin ground water, Bredehoeft insisted that modeling was the only tool available to help
inform public policy decisions. "That's it. We don't have another tool."
This time Taggart was representing Las Vegas.
Bredehoeft was well aware that Durbin hadn't given the result of his model, so he let drop that the Park Service had
also run it and produced a written a report on the result.
"Objection!" Taggart called. "Those documents are not in evidence and any statements about what the predictions in
those models say would be inappropriate."
The upshot: The Park Service report was also suppressed.
And so predictions by the Southern Nevada Water Authority's own modeler and the former head of the Nevada office
of the U.S. Geological Survey about what the cost to the Great Basin might befromLas Vegas pumping were never
entered into evidence.
"I allowed myself to be badly used," Durbin says. "I'm an adult. I allowed it to happen."
•••
It's April 16,2007, 3:30 p.m., at the Las Vegas offices of the Southern Nevada Water Authority.
Pat Mulroy halted a conversation in midsentence to reach for a pulsing BlackBerry. As she read the text message, a
small smile crossed her face.
Tracy Taylor, Nevada's state engineer, had just granted the authority somewhat less than half the water it asked for —•
40,000 acre-feet a year for 10 years.
In return, the authority would be required to "file an annual report by March 15 of each year detailing the findings of
the approved monitoring and mitigation plan."
After this, and presuming success, the amount could be raised to 60,000 acre-feet a year.
"Now, bear in mind, we'll be in Lincoln County first," a briefly triumphant Mulroy explained. "And in the Lincoln
County basins, there's no one. No one!"
She was referring to Cave, Dry Lake and Delamar valleys, three of the four basins that Katzer and Durbin envisioned
tiding Las Vegas over until Spring Valley could be aggressively tapped.
By December 2007, the state engineer's hearing concerning Dry Lake, Cave and Delamar valleys was approaching. Las
Vegas was seeking a total of almost 35,000 acre-feet a year.
Attorneys for Mulroy and the protesters were in the by now familiar pretrial ritual of exchanging evidence lists.
Among the scheduled witnesses was Timothy Durbin, except this time he was not testifying for Taggart, Brothers,
Mulroy and the water authority, but for the legal team representing the protesters.
Shortly after Christmas, Durbin's phone began to ring.
The first call had two people on the line: Taggart and an engineer from the water authority. Durbin says they wanted to
know whether it was true he was testifying and what he would testify about. "I was pretty guarded there. I don't trust
those people at all."
The second call, Durbin says, came from Katzer.
httn://www.lasvepassun com/new<;/900R/iun/?Q/nwen<?-vflllpv-mnHpl-wh«t-evnprt/
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"I told him I was feeling uncomfortable with my testimony in the Spring Valley hearing and I thought that the Southern
Nevada Water Authority had an obligation to disclose what the impacts were going to be and that was hidden in that
hearing."
The third call came from Mulroy's deputy. "I told Kay the same thing. Basically Kay said she was she was
disappointed but she respected my right to do it."
On the morning of Feb, 11, 2008, a clearly nervous Durbin again took the stand before the state engineer of Nevada.
"Please come forward and be sworn, Mr. Durbin. Nice to see you again," a curious hearing officer said.
And so, with Taggart objecting a few times, Durbin more or less recited to the court distillations of the memos that he
had sent during the past four years to Taggart and Mulroy about sacrificial choices and the problems of monitoring.
"All that the monitoring and mitigation can do is shift the focus of the impacts... I believe that their (Southern Nevada
Water Authority's) reliance on monitoring and mitigation is most likely not going to work," he said.
Las Vegas owed it to the public to discuss what the environmental effects of its Great Basin water were going to really
be, he said. "I think that for everybody concerned, including the rate payers in Las Vegas, that it's better to have that
discourse now."
Protesters braced themselves for a Las Vegas retort to Durbin's appearance.
There was none.
The strategy all along had been to keep Durbin's concerns off the record. Now that he'd had his day in court, they were
not about to call attention to it.
•••

Nearly four years after pledging to the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources that modern
protections make a repeat of Owens Valley impossible, Mulroy maintains the position.
Of Durbin's work, she says, "It's just a model!"
Shortly before publication of this series, Mulroy's information officer dismissed the Durbin-Katzer memo as
"recommendationsfromtwo consultants to a contract attorney on one potential course of action. That is two bus
transfers and a cab ride short of being a policy."
Brothers has heard the Owens Valley comparison so often for so long that the mere mention of it in an interview for
this story made her irate.
"They're totally different projects," she snapped. Owens Valley had a large lake. "To even compare them is to be out of
date and not understand what a ground water project is versus surface water."
Also, she noted, William Mulholland and early Los Angeles were not subjected to the modern protections ensured by
federal government.
Part of Brothers' management strategy for Spring Valley involves still-evolving ideas about capturing water that
streams off the hills in springtime, then evaporates on hot playas.
Ideally, she'd like to force this into the ground, just as she and Katzer used injection wells to store unused river water in
the Las Vegas Valley.
They also might use water purchased from the ranchers to help maintain the phreatophytes.
"I'm not saying that you would never lose a greasewood," she said, "but I think you would never lose much at all by
managing it properly."
httD://www.lasveeassun.com/news/2008/iun/29/owen^-vallev-rnodp1-whflt-pvnprt/
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Brothers is confident that if she sat down with Bredehoeft, Durbin and Katzer, they would see her point.
Becoming soothing, she added, "I don't know that we disagree."
But on hearing this, the normally shy Durbin retorted, "I hope she's lying, because otherwise she's a bad scientist."
In the early 1980s as then-director of the Geological Survey's California office, Durbin led modeling teams looking
precisely at the effect of Los Angeles' pumping on Owens Valley phreatophy tes.
Removing waterfromthe playas, Durbin said, almost perfectly emulates what Los Angeles did, first draining Owens
Lake and then pumping the ground water.
"The Owens Valley is a model of what to expect," he said.
Moreover, he added, playa water plays a key role in keeping down alkaline dust.
Another key part of Brothers' strategy is moving pumping around so as to "rest" certain areas.
But to Durbin, this wouldn't decrease the effect, but make it more diffuse, difficult to track and hard if not impossible
to reverse once damage became evident.
"We know from basic physics that in some time or some place the impacts of the pumping will be equal to the volume
of the pumping," Durbin said. "You don't need a ground water model to make that statement with absolute certainty.
It's simple. If you take water from one place and give it to another, it will be missed at the other end."
With the pipeline originator and his chosen modeler, Durbin, now gone, among the rank of scientists now reporting to
Brothers is a new modeler from the U.S. Geological Survey.
His model, still under construction, will not be able to embarrass them.
It will be used only to contrast predictions against measured effects of actual pumping.
If monitoring wells and models both suggest there are problems, monitoring committees will seek "consensus-based"
actions.
Mulroy's and Brothers' new team speculates greasewood may do just fine on rainwater that percolates around root
zones.
Mulroy and Brothers say they now have extra water to irrigate Spring Valley's greasewood if necessary and to keep the
ranches working, except with more efficient irrigation.
The Southern Nevada Water Authority plans to pump the Great Basin indefinitely.
It will revisit how much it intends to pump, possibly returning some water to White Pine County, only after paying off
the pipeline in 75 years.
Unlike the original Katzer-Durbin plan, they do not see the water now being sought from the "dry" valleys of Cave,
Dry and Delamar as temporary.
"I don't think in the lifetime of this project, we'll affect Pahranagat Springs," Southern Nevada Water Authority
hydrologist Andrew Burns says. "But having said that, we'll have monitoring of those pumping wells and those areas.
If we see effects, we'll have opportunity to move the pumping around."
The long and the short of it, Burns concludes, is "we're going to pump what's permitted to us."
•••
If this were fiction, the story would have a neat ending. But this being about the search for water in Nevada, it doesn't.
• The Southern Nevada Water Authority hopes to start importing Great Basin ground water in 2015.
httn://vvww.lasvetfassun.com/ne/w^
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• The state engineer's decision for Cave, Dry Lake and Delamar valleys is expected by October.
• Pretrial hearings over Snake Valley begin in mid-July and a hearing is expected by the end of the year. Because Snake
Valley sits on the state line, water will not be able to be taken from the valley until Utah approves it.
• The latest estimate of the pipeline cost is $3.5 billion, eliciting the quip from Ely Daily Times Editor Kent Harper that
it would be cheaper for Las Vegans to bathe in Dom Perignon than Great Basin ground water.
• If the Great Basin pipeline project fails, and drought persists on the Colorado River, Las Vegas' decision to keep
building and dare the Department of Interior to let it run dry will probably pay off. Few think that Uncle Sam would cut
off a city.
But Las Vegas would have to learn to live within its means — maybe by slowing growth — while searching for
alternate sources: building a desalination plant in California or Mexico then exchanging it for more Colorado River
water and pursuing more aggressive indoor conservation.
• Whatever the outcome of Mulroy's pipeline, Nevada Senator Harry Reid says, "you have to recognize what Pat
Mulroy's done with conservation. If she has no other legacy other than what she's done to conserve water in Southern
Nevada, her legacy is very significant."
• Former Clark County Manager Richard Bunker, the man who groomed Mulroy to become Las Vegas' water manager,
is largely retired.
One of the last jobs this fifth generation Southern Nevadan vows to do for Las Vegas is to represent Mulroy in
negotiations for Snake Valley's water.
When Bunker is finished with the Utah negotiations, he plans to spend as little time in Las Vegas as possible. He
devotes most of his time now to his ranch — in Utah.
Las Vegas no longer feels like home, he says.
"It's too crowded,"
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Section: Local
Western desert resolution urges input on water plan
Josh Loftin, Deseret Morning News
Residents of Utah's western desert received a political boost in their fight to
prevent a large portion of the region's groundwater from being piped to Las Vegas.
The Natural Resources, Agriculture and Environment Interim Committee approved
a resolution Wednesday that encourages more local involvement in the discussions
with Nevada. The resolution also calls for a delay of any final decisions until
scientific studies about the impact of removing the water from the aquifers are
completed.
"We have an important resource out in the west desert," said Rep. Richard
Wheeler, R-Ephraim, who sponsored the resolution. "And we have people's lives,
their livelihoods, at stake."
The focus of the resolution is a proposal by Nevada officials to pipe up to
176,000 acre feet of water from five aquifers in the region to Las Vegas. One of
the aquifers, which is located in the Snake Valley and straddles the Utah-Nevada
state line, could supply up to 25,000 acre feet of water.
The sparsely populated valley is used for ranching by mostly Utah residents.
Because of that, Utah officials have been negotiating to maintain the existing
aquifer in the valley.
The problem is that the water that feeds into the valley comes from mountains
in Nevada. Boyd Clayton of the Utah Division of Water Rights said that the negotiations with Nevada officials are working to find a system that will not turn the
water into a resource that is being sold before it can reach the Snake Valley.
"In Utah, we're not mining groundwater, and we're keen about making sure that
doesn't happen" in Nevada, Clayton said.
Nevada activists have filed suit in that state to put the brakes ont the ap-
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proval process and allow more time for public input.
Residents of the area, some of whom were in attendance at the committee hearing, would also like more involvement in the process. Ken Hill, who lives in Partoun, Juab County, said that even if they are not in the room during negotiations,
they would like somebody who is at least kept in the loop.
More importantly, he said that the resolution -- even though it is only approved by a committee and will probably not receive approval of the full Legislature until the next general session -- still provides Gov. Jon Huntsman Jr. and
other Utah officials with some needed support.
"It's encouraging, and we're hoping that it will give the governor some political elbow to do what he knows is right," Hill said.
E-mail: jloftin@desnews.com
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SL, Utah counties appeal Nevada's Snake Valley water grab
Patty Henetz
The Salt Lake Tribune
Aug. 7--Salt Lake and Utah counties have appealed a Nevada water official's
decision to keep them out of a project that would tap groundwater under Snake Valley and the west desert to feed growth in Las Vegas.
Last month, Nevada State Engineer Tracy Taylor denied the two counties' request
for "interested party" status, saying the counties should have filed a formal objection in 1989 to the Southern Nevada Water Authority's plans to build a $3.5
billion, 285-mile pipeline project.
In a lawsuit filed this week in Nevada state court, the Utah counties allege siphoning water from an aquifer that lies under the two states to feed Las Vegas
would cause vegetation to die. If that happens, winds could pick up the destabilized soils and send them in dust-storm clouds to the Wasatch Front , already
struggling with particulate pollution.
Twenty years ago, when Las Vegas filed its application in Nevada for the project,
little was known about the effects of groundwater pumping on air quality, the petition states.
Opponents say that if
of reach of the roots
to the destruction of
ter. Dust storms make

Las Vegas takes the groundwater, the water table will be out
from plants that fix the soil, the same phenomenon that led
the Owens Valley in California when Los Angeles imported wathe Owens Valley one of the nation's most polluted places.

All the Utah counties want is to be at the table while Taylor proceeds with the
project application, said Utah Association of Counties attorney Mark Ward.
"You cannot adequately assess the environmental soundness of this [water proposal]
without taking into account regional air quality," said Ward, who drafted the petition for the Nevada attorney representing the counties.
Taylor also denied requests for interested-party status from three Indian tribal
bands and grass-roots groups in a move seen as a new, aggressive tactic to push
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aside Utah concerns about what could happen to Snake Valley vegetation if the water table drops too low.
In its legal filing with the state engineer, the Southern Nevada Water Authority
says the interested-party applicants failed to demonstrate that extreme circumstances prevented them from filing official protests in 1989.
Utah and Nevada are still negotiating on the project, which requires both states'
approval. The U.S. Bureau of Land Management also is working on an environmental-impact study.
Taylor has said he would hold a final hearing on the project in late 2009.
phenetz@sltrib.com
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General Description:

34

This joint resolution of the Legislature expresses to the Governor the will of the

35

Legislature regarding the division of the aquifer shared with Nevada.

36
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37

This resolution:

38

•

urges the Governor to:

39

•

consider the consequences of a potential groundwater development project;

40

•

involve the citizens in developing the division agreement with Nevada; and

41

•

refrain from entering into the division agreement with Nevada until scientific

42

studies have been completed and the agreement provides how to divide the

43

water; and

44

•

45

Special Clauses:

46
47
48
49
50
51
52

directs a copy of the resolution be sent to various parties.

None
= = = = = = = = = = = ^
Be it resolved by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
WHEREAS, there is an interstate aquifer underlying Snake Valley in western Utah and
eastern Nevada;
WHEREAS, this aquifer is the source of the springs, seeps, and wells that support the
citizens' livelihoods and fragile ecosystem in Snake Valley and other areas of western Utah;

53

WHEREAS, the Southern Nevada Water Authority has filed groundwater applications

54

with the Nevada State Engineer to pump 50,680 acre-feet of water annually out of the aquifer

55

as part of the Clark, Lincoln, and White Pine Counties Groundwater Development Project;

56

WHEREAS, the impacts this groundwater development project could have on the water

57

resources, land, economy, wildlife, and overall quality of life in western Utah greatly concern

58

the citizens of the state;

59

WHEREAS, Public Law 108-424, the Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and

60

Development Act of 2004, requires the United States Geological Survey, the Desert Research

61

Institute, and a designee from the State of Utah to conduct a study known as the Basin and

62

Range Carbonate Aquifer System Study;

63
64

WHEREAS, the steps of the study required by the Lincoln County Conservation,
Recreation, and Development Act of 2004 are:
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67

(1)
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investigate groundwater quantity, quality and flow characteristics in the deep

carbonate and alluvial aquifers of White Pine County, Nevada;
(2)

investigate groundwater quantity, quality, and flow characteristics in any

68

groundwater basins that are located in White Pine County, Nevada, or Lincoln

69

County, Nevada, and adjacent areas in Utah;

70

(3)

include new data and review existing data;

71

(4)

determine the approximate volume of water in the aquifers;

72

(5)

determine the discharge and recharge characteristics of each aquifer system;

73

(6)

determine the hydrogeologic and other controls that govern discharge and

74
75
76
77

recharge of each aquifer system; and
(7)

develop maps at a consistent scale depicting the aquifer systems and the

recharge and discharge areas of such systems;
WHEREAS, the Bureau of Land Management's environmental impact study for the

78

groundwater development project will analyze the environmental impacts associated with the

79

anticipated groundwater withdrawal;

80

WHEREAS, the Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of

81

2004 requires that, prior to any transbasin diversion from groundwater basins located both

82

within the State of Nevada and the State of Utah, Utah and Nevada shall reach an agreement

83

dividing the water resources of the interstate groundwater flow systems in which those

84

interstate groundwater basins are located; and

85

WHEREAS, the Governor has assured the citizens of western Utah that he would not

86

approve a project that would compromise peoples' lives and livelihoods, and there would be

87

some continuity to their quality of life:

88

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Legislature urges the Governor to

89

carefully assess the groundwater development project's potential economic, social, and

90

environmental consequences in Utah, including assessing impacts to indigenous flora and

91

fauna and modeling groundwater behavior under any proposed pumping plan.

92

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Legislature urges the Governor to allow public
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93

participation in the development of the agreement with Nevada by inviting a citizen from

94

Snake Valley to participate in the negotiations with Nevada and allowing public review and

95

comment on a preliminary draft of the agreement.

96
97
98
99
100
101

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Legislature urges the Governor to refrain from
entering into an agreement with Nevada until:
(1) all steps of the scientific study required by the Lincoln County Conservation,
Recreation, and Development Act of 2004 are complete to ensure that there is an adequate
scientific basis on which to form an agreement; and
(2) the terms of the agreement itself provide for how to divide the water resources of

102

the interstate groundwater flow systems in which the interstate groundwater basins are located,

103

as required by the Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of 2004.

104

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that a copy of this resolution be sent to the Governor of

105

the state of Utah, the Governor of the state of Nevada, the Executive Director of the Utah

106

Department of Natural Resources, the Director of the Nevada Department of Conservation and

107

Natural Resources, the Utah State Engineer, the Nevada State Engineer, the General Manager

108

of the Southern Nevada Water Authority, and a representative of the Snake Valley Citizen's

109

Alliance.
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LONG TITLE

9

General Description:

10

This bill creates the Snake Valley Aquifer Research Team and Advisory Council.

11

Highlighted Provisions:

12

This bill:

13

• creates the Snake Valley Aquifer Research Team;

14

*• creates the Snake Valley Aquifer Advisory Council;

15

»• establishes council duties; and

16

• establishes research team data and information collection and reporting duties.

17
18
19
20

Monies Appropriated in this Bill:
None
Other Special Clauses:
None

21

Utah Code Sections Affected:

22

AMENDS:

23

63J-4-603, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 381 and renumbered and

24

amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 382

25

ENACTS:

26

63C-12-101, Utah Code Annotated 1953

27

63C-12-102, Utah Code Annotated 1953

28

63C-12-103, Utah Code Annotated 1953

29

63C-12-104, Utah Code Annotated 1953
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30

63C-12-105, Utah Code Annotated 1953

31

63C-12-106, Utah Code Annotated 1953

32

63C-12-107, Utah Code Annotated 1953

33

63C-12-108, Utah Code Annotated 1953

35
36

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 63C-12-101 is enacted to read:

37

CHAPTER 12. SNAKE VALLEY AQUIFER ADVISORY COUNCIL

38

63C-12-101. Title.

39

This chapter is known as the "Snake Valley Aquifer Advisory Council."

40

Section 2. Section 63C-12-102 is enacted to read:

41

63C-12-102. Definitions.

42

As used in this chapter:

43

(1) "Council" means the Snake Valley Aquifer Advisory Council created in Section

44
45
46

63C-12-103.
(2) "Research team" means the Snake Valley Research Team created in Section
63C-12-107.

47

Section 3. Section 63C-12-103 is enacted to read:

48

63C-12-103. Council creation - Members - Terms.

49

(1) There is created a state advisory council known as the "Snake Valley Aquifer

50

Advisory Council."

51

(2) The advisory council is composed of the following seven members:

52

(a) the governor or the governor's designee: and

53

(b) six members appointed by the governor as follows:

54

(i) two county commissioners, from individuals recommended by an organization that

55

represents counties in the state, who are residents of:

56

(A) Tooele County;

57

(B) Juab County;
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58

(C) Millard County; or

59

(D) Beaver County;

60

(ii) one elected representative of Salt Lake County government, from individuals

61

recommended by an organization that represents counties in the state;

62

(iii) two residents of:

63

(A) Tooele County;

64

(B) Juab County;

65

(C) Millard County; or

66

(D) Beaver County; and

67

(iv) a representative of the Confederate Tribes of Goshute Reservation.

68

(3) A member appointed under Subsection (2)(b) is appointed to a two-year term.

69

(4) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (3), the governor shall, at the time

70

of appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that the terms of council

71

members appointed under Subsection (2Kb) are staggered so that approximately half of the

72

council is appointed every two years.

73

(5) The governor shall appoint a chairperson.

74

(6) If a vacancy occurs in council membership for any reason the replacement shall be

75

appointed for the unexpired term in the same manner as the vacated member was appointed.

76

Section 4. Section 63C-12-104 is enacted to read:

77

63C-12-104. Advisory council duties — Meetings.

78

(1) The council shall:

79

(a) meet at least annually but may also meet at the call of:

80

(i) the chair; or

81

(ii) at least two council members;

82

(b) provide advice to the research team, including recommendations concerning the

83
84
85

type of data and information gathered by the research team;
(c) review the data and information gathered and reported by the research team,
including baseline data and changes from baseline data; and
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(d) act as liaison between the research team and the persons represented by the
council
(2) A majority of the council members constitute a quorum for the transaction of
council business
(3) The council may advise the governor and the Legislature on any issue relating to
its review under Subsection (l)(c)

92

Section 5 Section 63C-12-105 is enacted to read

93

63C-12-105. Compensation of members — Expenses,

94

(1) This section applies to members of the council

95

(2) (a) A member who is not a government employee may not receive compensation or

96

benefits for the member's service, but may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the

97

performance of the member's official duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance

98

under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107

99

(b) A member may decline to receive per diem and expenses for the member's service

100

(3) (a) A state government officer and employee member who does not receive salary,

101

per diem, or expenses from the agency the member represents for the member's service may

102

receive per diem and expenses incurred in the performance of the members official duties at

103

the rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107

104
105
106

(b) A state government officer and employee member may decline to receive per diem
and expenses for the member's service
(4) (a) A local government member who does not receive salary, per diem, or expenses

107

from the entity that the member represents for the member's service may receive per diem and

108

expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the rates established by

109

the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107

110
111

(b) A local government member may decline to receive per diem and expenses for the
member's service.

112

Section 6 Section 63C-12-106 is enacted to read

113

63C-12-106. Staff.
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The director of the Public Lands Policy Coordinating Office shall provide staff services
to the council.

116

Section 7, Section 63C-12-107 is enacted to read:

117

63C-12-107. Research team.

118

(1) There is created a Snake Valley Aquifer Research Team composed of the following

119
120
121
122
123
124
125

four members:
(a) a representative of the Division of Air Quality, appointed by the executive director
of the Department of Environmental Quality;
(b) a representative of the Department of Agriculture and Food, appointed by the
commissioner of the Department of Agriculture and Food;
(c) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources or the executive
director's designee; and

126

(d) the director of the Public Lands Policy Coordinating Office.

127

(2) The director of the Public Lands Policy Coordinating Office shall coordinate and

128

direct the research team's data and information compilation and reporting required by Section

129

63C-12-108.

130

Section 8. Section 63C-12-108 is enacted to read:

131

63C-12-108. Research team duties.

132

The research team shall:

133

(1) compile existing scientific research baseline data on the potential impact of the use

134

of water resources in the interstate groundwater flow system specified in the Lincoln County

135

Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-424, including the

136

impact on:

137

(a) surface water and groundwater;

138

(b) vegetation, including invasive species;

139

(c) agriculture;

140

(d) soils;

141

(e) air quality;
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142

(f) wildlife:

143

(g) the geologic integrity of the aquifer; and

144

(h) socioeconomic conditions;

145

(2) compile changes to the baseline data compiled under Subsection (1);

146

(3) seek to enter into cooperative agreements with governmental entities to share

147

relevant data and information;

148

(4) provide an annual data and information report to the council; and

149

(5) seek the voluntary participation of experts in academia and the private sector in the

150

activities of the research team.

151

Section 9. Section 63J-4-603 is amended to read:

152

63J-4-603. Powers and duties of coordinator and office,

153

(1) The coordinator and the office shall:

154

(a) assist the state planning coordinator in fulfilling the duties outlined in Section

155
156

63J-4-401 as those duties relate to the development of public lands policies by:
(i) developing cooperative contracts and agreements between the state, political

157

subdivisions, and agencies of the federal government for involvement in the development of

158

public lands policies;

159
160
161
162

(ii) producing research, documents, maps, studies, analysis, or other information that
supports the state's participation in the development of public lands policy;
(iii) preparing comments to ensure that the positions of the state and political
subdivisions are considered in the development of public lands policy;

163

(iv) partnering with state agencies and political subdivisions in an effort to:

164

(A) prepare coordinated public lands policies;

165

(B) develop consistency reviews and responses to public lands policies;

166

(C) develop management plans that relate to public lands policies; and

167

(D) develop and maintain a statewide land use plan that is based on cooperation and in

168
169

conjunction with political subdivisions; and
(v) providing other information or services related to public lands policies as requested
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by the state planning coordinator; [and]
(b) facilitate and coordinate the exchange of information, comments, and
recommendations on public lands policies between and among:

173

(i) state agencies;

174

(ii) political subdivisions;

175

(iii) the Office of Rural Development created under Section 63M-1-1602;

176

(iv) the Resource Development Coordinating Committee created under Section

177
178
179
180

63J-4-501;
(v) School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration created under Section
53C-1-201;
(vi) the committee created under Section 63F-1-508 to award grants to counties to

181

inventory and map R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, associated structures, and other features; and

182

(vii) the Constitutional Defense Council created under Section 63C-4-101;

183

(c) perform the duties established in Title 9, Chapter 8, Part 3, Antiquities, and Title 9,

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Chapter 8, Part 4, Historic Sites; [and]
(d) consistent with other statutory duties, encourage agencies to responsibly preserve
archaeological resources!:];
(e) provide staff services to the Snake Valley Aquifer Advisory Council created in
Section 63C-12-1Q3: and
(f) coordinate and direct the Snake Valley Aquifer Research Team created in Section
63C-12-107.
(2) In providing assistance to the state planning coordinator under Subsection (l)(a),
the coordinator and office shall take into consideration the:

193

(a) findings provided under Subsections 63J-4-401(6) and (7); and

194

(b) recommendations of the council.
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United States Constitution
Bill of Rights
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.

Amendment II
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

Amendment III
No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
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trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against h i m ; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Amendment VII
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law.

Amendment VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
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Addendum H

U.C.A. 1953, Const Art. 1, § 22
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Constitution of Utah
^Article I. Declaration of Rights
"frSec. 22. [Private property for public use]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 22

Addendum I

U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-201
WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30D. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT OF UTAH
PART 2. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-STATEMENT, SCOPE, AND EFFECT
§ 63-30d-201. Immunity of governmental entities from suit

(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, each governmental entity and
each employee of a governmental entity are immune from suit for any injury that results
from the exercise of a governmental function.

(2) Notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provisions of Section 63-30d-301, a
governmental entity, its officers, and its employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from the implementation of or the failure to implement measures to:
(a) control the causes of epidemic and communicable diseases and other conditions
significantly affecting the public health or necessary to protect the public health as set out
in Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local Health Departments;
(b) investigate and control suspected bioterrorism and disease as set out in Title 26,
Chapter 23b, Detection of Public Health Emergencies Act; and
(c) respond to a national, state, or local emergency, a public health emergency as defined
in Section 26-23b-102, or a declaration by the President of the United States or other
federal official requesting public health related activities.
Laws 2004, c. 267, § 11, eff. July 1, 2004.
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
Laws 1991, c. 15.
Laws 1991, c. 248.
Laws 2003, c. 3, § 5.
C. 1953, § 63-30-3.
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Addendum J

U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-301
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30D. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT OF UTAH
PART 3. WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY
§ 63-30d-301. Waivers of immunity—Exceptions

(l)(a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any contractual
obligation.
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations are not subject to the
requirements of Sections 63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, or 63-30d-601.
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from a
reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River
Development Act, if the failure to deliver the contractual amount of water is due to
drought, other natural condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in the
amount of available water.
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived:
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession of, or quiet title to real or
personal property;
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or other liens on real or personal
property, to determine any adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an
adjudication about any mortgage or other lien that the governmental entity may have or
claim on real or personal property;
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, damage, or loss of goods,
merchandise, or other property while it is in the possession of any governmental entity or
employee, if the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of
state law;
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(l), as to any action brought under the authority of
Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the
governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property
for public uses without just compensation;
(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any action brought to recover attorneys'
fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802; or
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah's Protection of Public Employees
Act.
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity from suit of each governmental
entity is waived as to any injury caused by:

(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley,
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them;
or
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, dam, reservoir,
or other public improvement.
(b) Immunity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, street, alley,
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them;
or
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure, dam,
reservoir, or other public improvement.
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment.

(5) Immunity is not waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional
trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights,
infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights;
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue,
deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection;
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if
malicious or without probable cause;
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional;
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil
disturbances;
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of
legal confinement;
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any condition existing in
connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by
the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire,
and State Lands;
(1) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(m) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems;
(o) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the
requirements of Section 41-6-14;

(p) the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(iv) emergency evacuations;
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency medical
assistance can be rendered or where the person can be transported by a licensed
ambulance service; or
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies;
(q) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, any function
pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources—Division of Water
Resources; or
(r) unauthorized access to government records, data, or electronic information systems by
any person or entity.
Laws 2004, c. 267, § 13, eff. July 1, 2004.
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
Laws 1965, c. 139
Laws 1991, c. 76.
Laws 1991, c. 251.
Laws 1995, c. 299, § 35.
Laws 1996, c. 159, § 6.
Laws 1996, c. 264, § 1.
Initiative B, adopted Nov. 7, 2000.
Laws 2001, c. 185, § 1.
C. 1953, §§ 63-30-5 to 63-30-10.5.
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Addendum K

U.C.A. 1953 § 73-1-8
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 73-1-8. Duties of owners of ditches—Safe condition—Bridges

The owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse shall maintain the same in
repair so as to prevent waste of water or damage to the property of others, and is required,
by bridge or otherwise, to keep such ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse in good
repair where the same crosses any public road or highway so as to prevent obstruction to
travel or damage or overflow on such public road or highway, except where the public
maintains or may hereafter elect to maintain devices for that purpose.

Laws 1919, c. 67, § 12.
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-1-8; C. 1943, § 100-1-8.
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